Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence by Greene, Linda Sheryl
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 49 Ferguson and Beyond 
2015 
Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and 
Actual Violence 
Linda Sheryl Greene 
University of Wisconsin Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law 
Commons, and the Law and Race Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an End to Structural and Actual Violence, 
49 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 001 (2015), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
1 
Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy  
Ferguson and Beyond 
Before and After Michael Brown†—Toward an End to 
Structural and Actual Violence 
Linda Sheryl Greene  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
PROLOGUE—THE KERNER COMISSION .................................................. 2 
I. INTRODUCTION—BEFORE AND BEYOND MICHAEL BROWN .............. 3 
II. REINTERPRETING DEADLY FORCE ..................................................... 7 
A. The Benign Dominant Narrative ............................................ 7 
B. The Insurgent Narrative ......................................................... 7 
C. A History of Racial Violence .................................................. 9 
D. The Psychological Turn ....................................................... 16 
E. Deadly and Excessive Force and Police Culture ................. 17 
III. A STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE ........................................................... 20 
A. Structural Violence ............................................................... 20 
B. Actual Violence ..................................................................... 27  
 
 
† See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT REGARDING THE ORIGINAL INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI BY POLICE OFFICER 
DARREN WILSON (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf.  
 
 Evjue-Bascom Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; A.B. California State 
University-Long Beach; J.D. University of California (Boalt Hall).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  Journal of Law & Policy  [Vol. 49:1 
 
 
1. The Death Penalty ......................................................... 27 
2. Prison Conditions and Indifference to Humanity .......... 34 
3. Deadly Force ................................................................. 36 
IV. BEYOND A JURISPRUDENCE OF VIOLENCE TOWARD 
ACCOUNTABILITY ......................................................................... 43 
A. Rethinking Deference to “Reasonable” Police Officers ...... 43 
B. Moral and Ethical Approaches ............................................. 47 
C. Increased Transparency: Video Cameras as Tools of 
Justice ................................................................................ 48 
1. Transparency and Morality ........................................... 48 
2. “Tools of Justice” .......................................................... 48 
D. Incentivizing Proactive Police Department Self 
Examination and Reform ................................................... 52 
E. Rethinking the Scope of Immunity ........................................ 53 
F. A Continued Role for the Department of Justice? ................ 54 
G. Restorative and Transitional Justice Approaches ................ 56 
1. Paradigm Shift—The Cincinnati Collaborative 
Process .................................................................... 56 
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND MICHAEL BROWN ...................................... 59 
 
PROLOGUE—THE KERNER COMISSION  
In 1967, Kenneth Clark, the expert witness whose research on the 
stigmatizing effects of racial school segregation formed a basis for 
the landmark Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education
1
 
testified before the National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders,
2
 convened by President Lyndon Johnson after racial unrest 
swept the nation’s urban centers.3  
 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 2. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (THE KERNER REPORT) (1968), available at 
http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/documents_us/Kerner%20Report.htm [hereinafter THE 
KERNER REPORT]. 
 3. See generally The President’s Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 721 (July 22, 1967); and Remarks Upon Signing Order Establishing the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 2 PUB. PAPERS 724 (July 29, 1967). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
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He said there was nothing new about the causes of Black unrest:  
I read that report . . . of the 1919 riot in Chicago, and it is as if 
I were reading the report of the investigating committee on the 
Harlem riot of ’35, the report of the investigating committee on 
the Harlem riot of ’43, the report of the McCone Commission 
on the Watts riot. I must again in candor say to you members 
of this Commission—it is a kind of Alice in Wonderland—
with the same moving picture re-shown over and over again, 
the same analysis, the same recommendations, and the same 
inaction.  
The Commission report summary concluded: 
We have provided an honest beginning. We have learned 
much. But we have uncovered no startling truths, no unique 
insights, no simple solutions. The destruction and the bitterness 
of racial disorder, the harsh polemics of black revolt and white 
repression have been seen and heard before in this country. It 
is time now to end the destruction and the violence, not only in 
the streets of the ghetto but in the lives of people.
4
 
But there is more involved than the occasional random violence of 
looting captured by the headlines.
5
 
I. INTRODUCTION—BEFORE AND BEYOND MICHAEL BROWN 
Darren Wilson’s shooting of an unarmed nineteen-year-old Black 
man, Michael Brown, was the tip of an iceberg of racial 
subordination and despair. The deep outrage over that shooting 
displayed in the small town of Ferguson, Missouri,
6
 the nation,
7
 and 
 
 4. THE KERNER REPORT, supra note 2. 
 5. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Clashes Rock Baltimore After Funeral, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/images/2015/04/28/nytfrontpage/scannat.pdf. 
 6. #Ferguson in Pictures Taken in the Wake of the Michael Brown Shooting, ST. LOUIS 
POST DISPATCH, http://www.stltoday.com/news/special-reports/michael-brown/ (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2015); and Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-ferguson-protests. 
html. 
 7. Holly Yan & Steve Almasy, London Is Latest City to See Protests as Ferguson 
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all over the world
8
 suggests that the shooting of Michael Brown was 
more than an isolated police killing of a Black teenager. The 
backstory involved the role of police departments and the criminal 
system in the lives of poor Blacks—the harassment, the violence, the 
hyper-criminalization, and the revolving door of mass 
incarceration—in combination with a racial and economic structure 
that systematically provides under-education, unemployment, and 
housing segregation.
9
 This Article posits that individual instances of 
police deadly force against unarmed Black men are enabled by a 
legal jurisprudence of structural violence which provides no 
accountability for the societal marginalization and stigmatization of 
young Black men, as well as by a jurisprudence of actual violence, 
which permits police officers to decide whom to target and whom to 
kill with virtually no threat of criminal sanction or institutional civil 
liability.  
Initially, I explore the evidence that racially discriminatory 
application of deadly force is not a new phenomenon but rather one 
with deep roots in American history. Next, I explore how current law 
eschews accountability and redress by exempting police officers from 
prosecution even in extreme cases and by limiting civil law suits 
based on constitutional principles through the generous immunity 
doctrine. I conclude that there are formidable legal barriers to redress 
individual shootings, and that in any event, these measures do not 
address the circumstances that abet racialized deadly force. There is a 
tension between the notion of individual officer responsibility and 
 
Dismay Spreads, CNN (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/26/us/national-
ferguson-demonstrations//. 
 8. Ferguson Protests Spread Across US, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:59 PM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/11/25/ferguson-protestsnationwidesecondnight.html; 
see also Yan & Almasy, supra note 7; Nina Porzucki, In France, Ferguson Protests Stir 
Memories of Suburban Riots, PRI (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:15 PM), http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-
08-15/france-ferguson-protests-stir-memories-suburban-riots; and Suman Varandani, Ferguson 
Protests: Rally Organizers in Canada Urge Non-Black People to Stay in Background, INT’L 
BUS. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:25 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/ferguson-protests-rally-
organizers-canada-urge-non-black-people-stay-background-1729598. 
 9. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC 
POLICIES AT THE ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), available at http://www.epi.org/files/2014/ 
making-of-ferguson-final.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
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institutional control and institutional failures
10
 not addressed in that 
jurisprudence.  
In Part III, I discuss the relationship between permissible deadly 
force and other areas of constitutional doctrine that foster a 
jurisprudence of violence and death in which the legitimacy of deadly 
force against Blacks comfortably sits. Death Penalty jurisprudence 
and here, a jurisprudence of violence which advocates vengeance 
oriented, inhumane “just deserts” principles that suggest that victims 
of police deadly force deserve punishment because police suspect 
them of crimes is consistent with a legal structure that virtually 
immunizes summary execution from legal sanction.
11
 Here, too, I 
emphasize that deadly force against Blacks symbolically reinforces a 
duty of absolute submission to police authority, and, as such, is a 
phenomenon integral contemporary American racial subordination. 
In Part IV, I note the recent efforts, by the United States Department 
of Justice (DOJ) and courts, to address racialized deadly force. The 
findings from city to city are strikingly similar: longstanding policies 
and procedures that permit the racially discriminatory use of deadly 
force without correction and even with reward, the simultaneous 
failure to investigate or prosecute serious Black on Black crime, the 
double vulnerability that results, and the deep mistrust between police 
 
 10. See generally GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, UNDERSTANDING POLICE 
USE OF FORCE (2004) (discussing the transition from nonregulation to internal control/self-
regulation, and the relationship each has on abuse of force by police); see also Geoffrey P. 
Alpert & John M. Macdonald, Police Use of Force: An Analysis of Organizational 
Characteristics, 18 JUST. Q. 393 (2001) (explaining that there is little known about how law 
enforcement agencies manage and influence officers’ use of force). 
 11. In Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), a police deadly force case central to the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine, Justice O’Connor wrote that the risk posed by home invasion 
burglary cases justified the use of deadly force to apprehend suspects. The “harsh potentialities 
for violence” inherent in the forced entry into a home preclude characterization of the crime as 
“innocuous, inconsequential, minor, or nonviolent.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 316 (1983) 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131, cmt. g (1934) (classifying 
burglary among felonies that normally cause or threaten death or serious bodily harm); and 471 
U.S. 1, 27–28 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because burglary is a serious and dangerous felony, 
the public interest in the prevention and detection of the crime is of compelling importance. 
Where a police officer has probable cause to arrest a suspected burglar, the use of deadly force 
as a last resort might well be the only means of apprehending the suspect.”). 
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departments and the cities they “protect and serve.”12 I conclude that 
if excessive and deadly force are to be curtailed, a reversal of current 
deadly force doctrine would be necessary. In the current state, unless 
the Justice Department investigates and alleges a pattern and practice 
of denial of constitutional rights, substantial damage redress is only 
available if citizen videotaped evidence demonstrates a wanton 
homicide, “and political circumstances require a substantial monetary 
verdict.”13   
 
 12. See, e.g., Dragnet: The Shooting Board (NBC television broadcast Sept. 21, 1967) 
(“You committed one of the cardinal sins in our business. You struck a man. And I’ll use your 
words: a man you’re hired to protect and to serve.”). 
 13. See, e.g. New Audio Captures S.C. Police Officer ‘Laughing” After Fatally Shooting 
Walter Scott, CNN WIRE (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:47 AM), http://ktla.com/2015/04/14/new-audio-
captures-s-c-police-officer-laughing-after-fatally-shooting-walter-scott/ [hereinafter Walter 
Scott Shooting]; Keith Alexander, Baltimore Reaches $6.4 Million Settlement with Freddie 
Gray’s Family, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/ 
baltimore-reaches-64-million-settlement-with-freddie-grays-family/2015/09/08/80b2c092-5196-
11e5-8c19-0b6825aa4a3a_story.html; and J. David Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is Settled by 
New York City for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/ 
14/nyregion/eric-garner-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html. 
 Events in Chicago last November also illustrate this pattern. In October, 2014 Chicago 
police officer Jason Vandyke shot Laquan McDonald. Prior to the release of the tapes by court 
order, the Police Department had said that the seventeen-year-old, who had a small knife, 
threatened officers, and that officer Van Dyke justifiably shot him sixteen times because Van 
Dyke felt threatened. Monica Davey, Officers’ Statements Differ From Video in Death of 
Laquan McDonald, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/06/us/ 
officers-statements-differ-from-video-in-death-of-laquan-mcdonald.html?_r=0. A $5 million 
settlement occurred in March, 2015 after it became evident to the parties that the video 
conflicted with official accounts, and that counsel for McDonald’s family and others would 
press for its release. Jeff Coen & John Chase, Top Emanuel Aides Aware of Key Laquan 
McDonald Details Months Before Mayor Says He Knew, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-rahm-emanuel-laquan-mcdonald-shooting-
met-20160113-story.html. A cascade of events occurred after release of the video which showed 
the seventeen-year-old walking away from police just before the officer shot him, including the 
dismissal of the police superintendent, murder charges against Van Dyke, and a Justice 
Department investigation. Davey, supra note 13.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
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II. REINTERPRETING DEADLY FORCE 
A. The Benign Dominant Narrative  
“[N]one of us want to see this [badge] turned into a hunting 
license.”14 
Police neutrality is abetted by a legal framework in which the 
specific interaction of a police officer and an individual is viewed 
through a narrow lens that accords great deference to the judgments 
of officers.
15
 This framework was exemplified in the Dragnet 
television series, created in cooperation with the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD). The series extolled a benevolent LAPD and 
featured the popular actor Jack Webb playing Sergeant Joe Friday. It 
aired during a particularly violent era of in the relations of the LAPD 
with the Black community of Los Angeles, with no major discussion 
of the racial dynamics of policing. These would emerge later. 
Dragnet was positively quaint, Madmen style, when viewed against 
subsequent comic
16
 and dramatic
17
 policing send-ups. 
B. The Insurgent Narrative 
The insurgent narrative—that race matters in specific ways that 
shape police interaction with minority communities—is not a new 
insight, but its bona fides have never been more powerful than in the 
context of the use of deadly force by police against Black males. On 
this front, it is difficult to know where to begin, whether with recent 
events such as the point blank police shooting of twelve-year-old 
 
 14. Dragnet: The Shooting Board, supra note 12. 
 15. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014). “We analyze this question from 
the perspective ‘of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight.’” Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).  
 16. BEVERLY HILLS COP (Paramount Pictures 1984), BEVERLY HILLS COP II (Paramount 
Pictures 1987), and BEVERLY HILLS COP III (Paramount Pictures 1994) are archetypes of the 
comic rendition of policing. 
 17. A more decorous form included FORT APACHE, THE BRONX (Time-Life Films, 1981), 
and Hill Street Blues (NBC television broadcast, 1981–1987). The Wire (HBO television 
broadcast, 2002–2008) would come later.  
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Tamir Rice,
18
 the vicious and heartbreaking video of Michael Slager 
shooting Walter Scott in the back and planting a Taser by his side,
19
 
or with Eric Garner’s pleas “I can’t breathe,”20 the riddling of 
unarmed Amadou Diallo’s body with forty-one gun shots,21 or with 
the shooting of twenty-two-year-old Oscar Grant in the back by Bay 
Area Rapid Transit police officer Johannes Mehserle, in front of a 
crowd of Grant’s teenage friends as he lay face down on a train 
platform.
22
  
Though the objective statistics about the use of force say that the 
use of deadly force is rare,
23
 the recent now-publicized record of 
police violence against Black males reopens the obligatory question 
about whether “race matters”24 and its contemporary claim that posits 
a “post racial”25 society in which race is irrelevant. As with so many 
 
 18. Tamir Rice: Police Release Video of 12-Year-Old’s Fatal Shooting—Video, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/nov/ 
26/cleveland-video-tamir-rice-shooting-police; see also Cory Shaffer, Extended Tamir Rice 
Shooting Video Shows Officers Restrained Sister, CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 7, 2015, 10:39 AM), 
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/01/extended_tamir_rice_shooting_v.html; and 
Elisha Fieldstadt, Fatal Shooting of Cleveland Boy Tamir Rice Was Caused by His Own 
Actions: City, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/f 
atal-shooting-cleveland-boy-tamir-rice-was-caused-his-own-n314861. 
 19. Manny Fernandez, After Walter Scott Shooting, Scrutiny Turns to 2nd Officer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/18/us/after-walter-scott-shooting-
scrutiny-turns-to-2nd-officer.html?_r=0. 
 20. Emily Badger, There Is a Second Eric Garner Video. It May Be More Disturbing 
Than the First, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/ 
wp/2014/12/05/there-is-a-second-eric-garner-video-it-may-be-more-disturbing-than-the-first/.  
 21. Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shooting-are-acquitted-all-
charges.html. See also BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, AMERICAN SKIN (Columbia Records 2001) 
(memorializing Armadou Diallo).  
 22. Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 724 F.3d 1156, 1166 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 23. See MICHAEL SMITH ET AL., A MULTIMETHOD EVALUATION OF POLICE USE OF FORCE 
OUTCOME: FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1–1 (2010) (stating that 
“previous studies have shown that 1-2 per cent of police citizen contacts involve the threat or 
application of physical force by the police”).  
 24. See generally CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS (1994) (analyzing moral authority and 
racial debates concerning skin color in the United States). 
 25. This is not a new topic and the vigorous refutation of the resilience of race is not a 
new endeavor. See Derrick Bell, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 197–200 (1992) (arguing that racism is endemic to American society); See also Jerome 
McCristal Culp, Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy 
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162, 164 (1994) (“[T]he 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
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questions in this realm, a direct engagement of the “post racial” claim 
in the context of police uses of force requires resort to historical 
approaches, sociological data, criminological literature, and 
psychological paradigms.  
C. A History of Racial Violence 
The question of police use of deadly force is important to all 
citizens, despite the fact that there are disputes over whether police 
use of force statutes are accurate. But the examination of police 
violence against Blacks requires a wider lens in order to situate these 
phenomena against the background of history. A history of racial 
violence focuses on the role of criminal processes in the historical 
subordination of Blacks during and after slavery, as well as the 
phenomenon of historical racialized judicial and extrajudicial 
violence, both and examination as well as more focused inquiries into 
the evidence of the role of race in policing generally, and uses of 
deadly force more specifically.
26
 In his comprehensive book Justice 
A. Leon Higginbothom documented the foundation of a dual criminal 
system which early colonial legislatures devised a differential system 
of offenses and punishments for slaves, masters, and other free 
persons to facilitate both the maintenance of slave master hegemony 
as well as the protection of slaves as property.
27
 Maclin traced these 
practices from 1693, noting that “[i]n America, police targeting of 
 
Supreme Court has adopted colorblindness as a legal watchword, even as it systematically 
limits the access of blacks to job and jury duty, and permits racially disparate and onerous 
police interrogation and investigation of black Americans.”) (footnotes omitted) (citing Dwight 
L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless 
Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2043–57 (1993) and Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 1253, 1313 (2011) (describing postracialism’s threat as “a compelling ideological 
frame . . . poised to exile racial justice discourse to the hinterlands of contemporary political 
thought.”).  
 26. See generally Daniel Flanighan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum 
South, 40 J. S. HIST. 537 (1974). 
 27. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978). See also MARK TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003); and THE AMERICAN 
LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810–1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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black people for excessive and disproportionate search and seizure is 
a practice older than the Republic itself.”28 Other authors have 
documented the role of violence during Reconstruction and 
“Redemption,” the period after Republicans abandoned 
Reconstruction oversight in return for the presidency of Rutherford 
B. Hayes.
29
 The violence continued as white and law enforcement 
attacked thriving Black communities around the country in the early 
20th century through anti-Black programs that began with the Red 
Summers of 1919 throughout the Southern and Border states and 
continued until the 1930s.
30
 The lynchings, disproportionate 
executions, police shootings, and the police violence against Blacks 
that led to Black protests during the 1920s through the 1940s are 
recounted in the Kerner Commission report.
31
 
And the discussion of police shootings of Blacks is not a new 
topic. In 1976, John Goldkamp noted the evidence from the 1960s 
and 1970s demonstrating the disproportionate use of deadly force by 
police departments against Blacks around the United States.
32
 He 
reported incidences of Black and other minority deaths by deadly 
force in major cities across the country that were many multiples of 
those recorded for whites, despite making up far less of the 
population.
33
   
 
 28. Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 333–36 
(1998).  
 29. See RICHARD FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 120–
22, 203–05, 447 (1989) (noting violence after the end of Reconstruction). See also LEON 
LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG 277 (1980) (noting racial violence during the 
Freedman Bureau era); and LITWACK, TROUBLE IN THE MIND (1998) (noting racial violence 
after Reconstruction).  
 30. CAMERON MCWHIRTER, RED SUMMER: THE SUMMER OF 1919 AND THE AWAKENING 
OF BLACK AMERICA (2011) (noting white racial violence against Blacks in Chicago); see also 
JAMES S. HIRSCH, RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE: THE TULSA RACE WAR AND ITS LEGACY 55–56 
(2003) (noting white racial violence against Blacks in America from 1900–1919). 
 31. THE KERNER REPORT, supra note 2. 
 32. John Goldkamp, Minorities as Victims of Police Shootings: Interpretations of Racial 
Disproportionality, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 1969 (1976).  
 33. Id. at 169 n.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
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More recent data, from 2010 through 2012, are consistent with 
previous data: 
Young black males in recent years were at a far greater risk of 
being shot dead by police than their white counterparts—21 
times greater, according to a ProPublica analysis of federally 
collected data on fatal police shootings.  
 The 1,217 deadly police shootings from 2010 to 2012 
captured in the federal data show that blacks, age 15 to 19, 
were killed at a rate of 31.17 per million, while just 1.47 per 
million white males in that age range died at the hands of 
police.  
 One way of appreciating that stark disparity, ProPublica’s 
analysis shows, is to calculate how many more whites over 
those three years would have had to have been killed for them 
to have been at equal risk. The number is jarring—185, more 
than one per week.
34
 
The Justice Department data also shows stark disparities data from 
2003 to 2008. From January 2003 to December 2009, 4,813 deaths 
were reported to the Department’s Arrest Related Deaths (ARD) 
program, which defined an ARD as occurring “during or shortly after 
law enforcement personnel attempted to arrest or restrain them.” Of 
these deaths, 32 percent were Black or African Americans and 20 
percent were Hispanic or Latino.
35
  
 There exists a similar pattern in regards to the disproportionate 
use of police deadly or excessive force in numerous cities. The DOJ 
has investigated twenty police departments in the last ten years. The 
Department’s Civil Rights Division, Office of Special Litigation 
undertakes these investigations pursuant to the Violent Crime Control 
and Law enforcement Act of 1994,
36
 and Title IV of the Civil Rights 
 
 34. Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann Grochowski Jones & Eric Sagara, Deadly Force, in Black 
and White, ProPublica (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-
force-in-black-and-white. 
 35. ANDREA BURCH, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST RELATED DEATHS, 2003–2009, 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ard0309st.pdf.  
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2015). 
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Act of 1964, which forbids racial discrimination in any federal 
programs that receives federal assistance.
37
 These laws permit the 
DOJ to initiate a civil lawsuit to remedy patterns or practices of 
conduct by law enforcement agencies that deprive individuals of 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws. 
These investigations have found that departments engage in the 
unnecessary and excessive use of deadly force, including shootings 
and hit strikes with impact weapons; that they engage in unnecessary, 
excessive or retaliatory use of less lethal force including Tasers, 
chemical sprays and fists; that they use excessive force against 
persons who were mentally ill and in crisis, including in cases where 
the officers were called exclusively for a welfare check; that they use 
dangerous tactics that place officers in situations where avoidable 
force becomes inevitable; that they fail to adequately review and 
investigate officers’ use of force; that they fail to objectively 
investigate all allegations of misconduct; that they fail to identify and 
respond to patterns of that high risk behavior; and that they fail to 
provide its officers with the support, training, supervision, and 
equipment needed to allow them to do their job safely and 
effectively.
38
 The Department of Justice has obtained consent decrees 
across the country, from places as disparate as Los Angeles to 
Philadelphia,
39
 and more recently, Ferguson.
40
  
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2015). 
 38. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE 
1 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/ 
2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF 
THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE].  
 39. See, e.g., Civil Rights Consent Decree, LAPD, http://www.lapdonline.org/search_ 
results/content_basic_view/928 (last accessed Dec. 12, 2015); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2011), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED 
STATES INVESTIGATION OF THE MARICOPA SHERRIFF’S OFFICE 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/15/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf; and 
GEORGE FACHNER AND STEVEN CARTER, CNA ANALYSIS & SOLUTIONS COLLABORATIVE 
REFORM INITIATIVE: AN ASSESSMENT OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 1 (2015), available at http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0753-pub.pdf 
(noting cooperative agreement with U.S. Department of Justice); see generally Stephen Rushin, 
Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3199 (2014).  
 40. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2015), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/ 
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There is much literature on the causes of these racial disparities in 
the use of force.
41
 The classical debate framed by Goldkamp involved 
two hypotheses, one positing internal police organization causation 
and the other positing Black hyper-criminality: 
Belief Perspective I holds that minority overrepresentation 
among shooting victims is a result of differential police 
practices . . . [and] attributes black disproportion among 
shooting victims to variables internal to police organizations 
(e.g. racism by officers and by the administrators who 
encourage or allow them to express it by shooting blacks in 
situations in which they would refrain from shooting whites). 
Belief Perspective II views black shooting victim disproportion 
as a consequence of variables external to police organizations. 
From this perspective, black shooting victim disproportion is 
seen as a consequence of justifiable police responses to the 
relatively great involvement of blacks in violent crime and 
other activities likely to precipitate shootings.
42
  
Fyfe suggested that, though there might be confirmation of the view 
that the disproportion of Blacks and minorities as victims of crime 
and as suspects might explain racial the disparities in use of force 
these statistics may be “artifacts of differential police enforcement 
and reporting practices. In other words, it may be that disparities in 
police shootings of Blacks and arrests of Blacks may be the a result 
of arbitrariness in arrest and crime reporting practices, as well as in 
shooting practices.”43  
 
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT]. 
 41. All against a background of disparity over the accuracy of statistics. See, e.g., 
Geoffrey Alpert and Roger Dunham, UNDERSTANDING POLICE USE OF FORCE 13–15 (2004) (or 
methodology)). 
 42. James J. Fyfe, Blind Justice: Police Shootings in Memphis, 73 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 707, 708 (1982). 
 43. Id. at 709. He examined the shooting statistics of two cities, placing shooting into 
categories of elective and non-elective shootings, and concluded that “elective shootings rates 
are most greatly influenced by factors internal to police organizations. . . .” Id. at 711. 
Numerous studies show the role of racial discrimination in policing. More recently, a United 
States District Court judge concluded that the New York City Police Department’s long-
standing stop and frisk policy amounts to racial profiling, and imposed federal monitoring of 
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Fyfe reasoned that gross comparisons of shootings rates are not 
meaningful alone in evaluating disparities in the use of force. But 
when Fyfe divided shootings between elective shootings (where the 
officer is not at risk) and non-elective shootings (where the officer 
must “shoot or risk death or serious injury to himself or others”) the 
rates were objectively comparable. He concluded that “elective 
shooting rates are most greatly influenced by factors internal to police 
organizations. . . .”44  
Since Goldkamp and Fyfe wrote, the DOJ has developed much 
additional information on racially discriminatory policing. It has 
funded research on police use of force,
45
 and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14141, it has investigated whether the cities and counties have 
engaged in “a pattern and practice” of violation of constitutional 
limitations on the use of force.
46
 Over a period of years, DOJ 
investigative reports found patterns and practices of racially 
discriminatory law enforcement in numerous locales and settled cases 
before investigative reports to curtail deadly force in numerous other 
jurisdictions.
47
 
Another important dimension of the racial dimension of policing 
is the level of Black victims of crime and the disparity in the 
 
the City of New York. Floyd v. New York, No. 13-3088-cv 1, 10 (2d Cir. argued Oct. 15, 
2015), available at https://ccrjustice.org/files/2d%20Circuit%20Decision%20Affirming%20 
Denial%20of%20Union%20Intervention_0.pdf. Scholars have long criticized Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968) as a license for racially discriminatory policing. See Tracey Maclin, Terry v. 
Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1271, 1321 (1998); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Location: The Fourth 
Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1337 (1990). 
 44. Fyfe, supra note 42, at 711. The chief can direct his officers not to shoot the backs of 
unarmed fleeing property crime suspects without increasing risk to officers caused by 
encounters with such suspects. Id.  
 45. The National Institute of Justice has funded research on police use of force, race and 
policing. Publications Related To: Law Enforcement, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij. 
gov/publications/pages/publication-list.aspx?tags=Law%20Enforcement (last visited Dec. 31, 
2015). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to pursue civil 
and equitable relief against law enforcement agencies if they engage in “a pattern and practice” 
of unlawful conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 14141.  
 47. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.  
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prosecution of those crimes. In 1998, Tracey Meares called this 
“underpolicing.”48 She noted: 
Even after controlling for socioeconomic status researchers 
still found that blacks were almost twice as likely to be crime 
victims as whites in the same low-income group. Surveys also 
revealed that—like homicide—rape, aggravated assault, 
burglary, and auto theft were predominantly intragroup 
offenses. Due to residential segregation, it is likely that 
minority victims often were victimized by their neighbors.  
 As the Kerner Commission Report noted, police responded 
to these problems by doing nothing. Police failure to promote 
adequate protection and services in disadvantaged minority 
neighborhoods was a common complaint before the 
Commission. Of course, the arrest rates referred to above 
reflect only the serious crimes tracked by the FBI Crime 
Reports. These reports obscure the even greater number of 
commonly-occurring disorder offenses. White police officers 
patrolling urban ghettoes, however, often dismissed violations 
of sex, drinking and gambling laws along with intraracial 
simple assaults as “typically Negro.”  
 Just as underpolicing of crime and disorder in many 
segregated, impoverished urban neighborhoods was a common 
problem, so was overpolicing in the form of harassment and 
brutality.
49
  
Jill Loevy has commented on the unsolved murders of young 
Black men. “I did a count in 2008 of 300-some LA homicides of the 
gang-related homicides, and I think something like 40 percent of the 
victims were this sort of victim—noncombatant, not directly party to 
the quarrel that instigated the homicide, but ended up dead 
 
 48. Tracey Meares and Dan Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A 
Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 203–04 (1998).  
 49. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). 
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nonetheless.”50 Furthermore, she notes that “[y]oung black men in 
their early 20s . . . had a rate of death from homicide that was higher 
than those of American troops in Iraq in about 2005 . . . . So people 
talk about a war zone—it was higher than a combat death rate.”51 
They are afraid to cooperate. 
Justice Department statistics show that homicide rates are down to 
rates observed in the 1960s, but that nonetheless Blacks are 
disproportionately represented as perpetrators and victims
52
 Justice 
Department statistics also show that homicide rates were up from 
“4.6 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1962 to 9.7 per 100,000 by 
1979.”53 Over time, the homicides went up and down between 1980 
and 1991, but by 2011 the homicide rate was “4.7 homicides per 
100,000.”54 Despite the decline overall, between 1980 and 2008 the 
Black victimization rate was “27.8 per 100,000—six times higher 
than the rate for whites.”55  
D. The Psychological Turn 
The psychological turn focuses on the role of cognition and bias in 
racially discriminatory policing. At the general level, there is strong 
evidence that race affects perceptions and judgments.
56
 If the 
discussion does not begin with the specific instances of deadly force 
against unarmed Blacks, then perhaps it might as productively begin 
with the scientific evidence that unconscious bias exists and then turn 
 
 50. Why a Black Man’s Murder Often Goes Unpunished in Los Angeles (NPR radio 
broadcast Jan. 24, 2015), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php? 
storyId=379156732. 
 51. Id.  
 52. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1980–2008: ANNUAL RATES FOR 2009 AND 2010 2–3 (Nov. 2011), available 
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf [hereinafter HOMICIDE TRENDS]. 
 53. ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN THE U.S. 
KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2011 2 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/hus11.pdf. 
 54. Id. at 1–3. 
 55. HOMICIDE TRENDS, supra note 52, at 3.  
 56. See generally Cheryl Staats, State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2014, KIRWIN 
INST. 12 (2014) (reviewing important research and conferences on implicit bias, the popularity 
of the topic in mainstream lay media, and university initiatives on the topic). 
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to the body of work that requires that the lens of implicit bias be 
trained on racially discriminatory policing in general and the use of 
deadly force in particular.
57
 Here, too, there is a deep body of work 
both within legal literature
58
 and without
59
 and an ever more 
sophisticated probing of the complex circumstances in which race 
wields its powerful and deadly force.
60
 In particular, an important 
observation in the context of policing suggests that implicit bias 
affects officers’ interpretations of events, level of aggression, and 
amenability of behavior to modification.
61
 
E. Deadly and Excessive Force and Police Culture 
A more recent concern about police culture is the increasing 
militarization of police ideology and practice, This phenomenon 
emerged in 1968 when Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, legislation aimed at combatting 
domestic crime and political movements.
62
 Among other measures, 
the legislation provided for assistance to state and local law 
 
 57. For legal literature on unconscious bias, see Linda Greene, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law Twenty Years After The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Prospects for the 
Realization of Equality in Employment, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 593, 600 (1984) (noting that 
“substantial sociological and psychological research indicates that race and gender 
characteristics play determinative roles in the perception and judgment process.”). See also 
Linda Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentation of an African 
American Female Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 84 (1990) (discussing the 
unconscious bias phenomena associated with tokenism).  
 58. See, e.g., John Goldkamp, Minorities as Victims of Police Shootings, Interpretations 
of Racial Disproportionality and Police Use of Deadly Force, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 169, 169 n.2, 179 
(1976–1977) (documenting the disproportionality of deadly force against Blacks). See also 
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post Racial 
Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 101, 155 (2012–2013). 
 59. LORIE A. FRIDELL ET AL., RACIALLY BIASED PROFILING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 
(2001). 
 60. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267 (2012) (“[O]fficer character is an important component to 
creating an institutional environment that facilitates the protection of citizen privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion.”) [hereinafter Cognative Bias]; L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: 
Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961 (2014–2015). 
 61. Richardson, Cognitive Bias, supra note 60, at 271–77.  
 62. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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enforcement agencies.
63
 Between 1988 and 1991, to further the “War 
on Drugs” both Congressional legislation and Department of Defense 
directives provided to state and local police departments U.S. 
Military tactical support, coordination.
64
 In addition, police 
departments developed Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) 
teams,
65
 increasing the perception
66
 that local police departments had 
adopted military tactics
67
 as a matter of course and seemed to run 
counter to the development of professionalism and community 
oriented policing approaches pioneered by Herman Goldstein of the 
University of Wisconsin Law School
68
 and adopted in jurisdictions 
around the country, often out of crises resulting from excessive and 
deadly force incidents that provoked widespread community unrest.
69
 
In addition, bold militarization was enhanced as a result of a series 
of federal government equipment transfer programs. American Civil 
Liberties Union released
70
 the report War Comes Home: The 
Excessive Militarization of American Policing.
71
 Examples of 
weapons include military grade weapons in Maricopa City, Arizona, 
where an unarmed homeless man was recently shot at night while 
police used night vision equipment. That same department received 
32 bomb suits, 704 night vision units, 42 forced entry tools (such as 
 
 63. See generally Donald Alexander, New Resources for Crime Control: Experience 
Under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205 
(1971).  
 64. Thomas S.M. Tudor, The Military and the War on Drugs, 37 F. L. REV. 267, 269–73 
(1994)  
 65. Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 66. Popular media reinforced the reality with glamourized depictions of SWAT teams 
with all black uniforms and armor featuring poular movie stars in lead roles. See, e.g., S.W.A.T 
(Columbia Pictures 2003) (staring Samuel L. Jackson, Colin Farrell, and Jeremy Renner).  
 67. See DAVID A. KLINGER & JEFF ROJEK, A MULTI-METHOD STUDY OF SPECIAL 
WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAMS (2008)).  
 68. Id. at 1 (citing HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING (1990)). 
 69. KLINGER & ROJEK, supra note 67, at 1. 
 70. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION 
OF AMERICAN POLICING (2014) [hereinafter WAR COMES HOME]. 
 71. Id. at 2 (“Carried out by ten or more officers armed with assault rifles, flashbang 
grenades, and battering rams, these paramilitary raids disproportionately impacted people of 
color, sending the clear message that the families being raided are the enemy. This unnecessary 
violence causes property damage, injury, and death.”). 
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battering rams), surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, military 
trucks, armored vehicles, and helicopters
72
 pursuant to the 1033 
program
73
 through which the Department of Defense transfers 
military equipment to local law enforcement—to the tune of $4.3 
billion dollars.
74
 In addition, the Department of Justice provided 
funding for a variety of activities,
75
 but 64 percent of police 
departments spent the funding on lethal and non-lethal weapons, 
tactical vests, and body armor.
76
 Furthermore, the Department of 
Homeland Security has also provided funding.
77
  
The effects of such militarization were on prominent display in 
the immediate aftermath of the police shooting of Michael Brown. 
Protesting citizens found tanks and armored vehicles in their streets 
and the focal point of the demonstrations included not only the killing 
of an unarmed teen, but the specter of an all white police force garbed 
in combat uniforms with military grade equipment and their weapons 
pointed to an entire Black Community.
78
  
 
 72. Id. at 13.  
 73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. 104-201, 110 Stat. 
2422.  
 74. WAR COMES HOME, supra note 70, at 24.  
 75. The DOJ plays an important role in the militarization of the police through programs 
such as the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program. Established in 
1988, the program was originally called the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law 
Enforcement. “Military weapons included the Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter 
Attack Truck (BEARCAT) and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Given 
away in 2013, the United States decommissioned twenty-seven thousand of those vehicles, 
many of which reside with local police departments.” See also RADEY BALKO, CATO 
INSTITUTE, OVERKILL: THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY POLICE RAIDS IN AMERICA 10 (2006), 
available at http://www.cato.org/publications/white-paper/overkill-rise-paramilitary-police-
raids-america. 
 76. BALKO, supra note 75, at 10.  
 77. Id.  
 78. See Joe Coscarelli, Behind the Best Pictures from Ferguson, with Getty Photographer 
Scott Olson, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 20, 2014, 4:05 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/ 
2014/08/behind-the-best-pictures-from-ferguson.html#. 
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III. A STRUCTURE OF VIOLENCE 
A. Structural Violence 
 “Structural violence” is one way of describing social 
arrangements that put individuals and populations in harm’s 
way. . . . The arrangements are structural because they are 
embedded in the political and economic organization of our 
social world; they are violent because they cause injury to 
people. . . . 
[N]either culture nor pure individual will is at fault; rather, 
historically given (and often economically driven) processes 
and forces conspire to constrain individual agency. Structural 
violence is visited upon all those whose social status denies 
them access to the fruits of scientific and social progress. . . . 
Human rights violations are . . . symptoms of deeper 
pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social 
conditions that so often determine who will suffer abuse and 
who will be shielded from harm.
79
  
Farmer relied on the path breaking work of Johan Galtung, whose 
essay “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”80 provided a framework 
for understanding the dichotomies of violence and the manner in 
which various forms of violence stabilize injustice and 
simultaneously sustain volatility increase the potential for direct 
violence in society.
81
 
Galtung’s path-breaking work explored the various dimensions of 
violence that are present in the state.
82
 “As a point of departure, let us 
say that violence is present when human beings are being influenced 
 
 79. Paul E. Farmer et al., Structural Violence and Clinical Medicine, 3 PLOS MED. 1686 
(2006); PAUL FARMER, INFECTIONS AND INEQUALITIES: THE MODERN PLAGUE 79 (1999); 
PAUL FARMER, PATHOLOGIES OF POWER: HEALTH, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WAR ON 
THE POOR 7 (2004).  
 80. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167 (1969). 
 81. Paul Farmer, An Anthropology of Structural Violence, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
305, 307 (2004). 
 82. Galtung, supra note 80, at 168–72. 
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so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their 
potential realizations.”83  
Galtung noted the six dimensions of violence that contributed to 
the difference between the potential and the actual, and also 
explained the distinction as well as the link between indirect violence 
and direct violence.
84
 There is a “potential [possible] level of 
realization which is possible with a given level of insight and 
resources . . . [unless] resources are monopolized by a group or class 
or are used for other purposes.”85 If this occurs, “violence is present 
in the system. . . . [T]here is also the direct violence where the means 
of realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed.”86 
Galtung noted two forms of violence and made a distinction 
between physical and psychological violence:  
Under physical violence human beings are hurt somatically, to 
the point of killing. It is useful to distinguish further between 
‘biological violence’, which reduces somatic capability (below 
what is potentially possible), and ‘physical violence as such’, 
which increases the constraint on human movements—as when 
a person is imprisoned or put in chains, but also when access to 
transportation is very unevenly distributed, keeping large 
segments of a population at the same place with mobility a 
monopoly of the selected few. But that distinction is less 
important than the basic distinction between violence that 
works on the body, and violence that works on the soul.
87
 
Another important observation concerns the psychological injuries 
inflicted by threats of violence:  
When a person, a group, a nation is displaying the means of 
physical violence, whether throwing stones around or testing 
nuclear arms, there may not be violence in the sense that 
anyone is hit or hurt, but there is nevertheless the threat of 
 
 83. Id. at 168 (italics in original omitted). 
 84. Id. at 168–72. 
 85. Id. at 169. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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physical violence and indirect threat of mental violence that 
may even be characterized as some type of psychological 
violence since it constrains human action. Indeed, this is also 
the intention. . . .
88
 
 Galtung next connected structural and actual violence. Actual 
violence is a type of violence “where there is an actor that commits 
the violence as personal or direct, and to violence where there is no 
such actor as structural or indirect. In both cases individuals may be 
killed or mutilated, hit or hurt in both senses of the word and 
manipulated . . . .”89 
[I]n the first case these consequences can be traced back to 
concrete persons as actors, in the second case this is no longer 
meaningful. There may not be any person who directly harms 
another person in the structure. The violence is built into the 
structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as 
unequal life chances . . . as when income distributions are 
heavily skewed, literacy/education unevenly distributed, 
medical services [access differs for groups] . . . if the persons 
low on income are also low in education, low on health, and 
low on power . . . .  
The important point here is that if people are starving when 
this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed . . . 
where life expectancy is twice as high in the upper as in the 
lower classes, violence is exercised even if there are no 
concrete actors [to which] one can point . . . [this] condition of 
structural violence [is also called] social injustice.”90 
Galtung made a fifth distinction between violence that is intended or 
unintended, one important to rendering structural violence 
irremediable. He noted that Roman jurisprudence and Judeo-
 
 88. Id. at 170.  
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 170–71. 
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Christian ethics focus on intention. That focus installs “a bias that 
renders acceptable social injustice.”91  
Finally Galtung distinguished between two levels of violence—
manifest violence and latent violence.
92
 Latent violence exists when 
“the situation is so unstable that the actual realization level ‘easily’ 
decreases.” Here, Galtung hoped to capture the human instability and 
the low value on human life that is a consequence of structural 
violence. “[A] little challenge [will] trigger considerable killing and 
atrocity.”93 Latent violence “indicates a situation of unstable 
equilibrium, where the level of actual realization is not sufficiently 
protected against deterioration by upholding mechanisms.”94 This 
violence is also called symbolic violence.  
The search for solutions to the historical, enduring, and 
widespread vulnerability of Black males to police violence requires a 
more probing assessment of the conditions that create the potential 
for this species of racial violence and for its repetitive nature. The 
circumstances in which the phenomenon occurs repeatedly involve 
deeply rooted inequalities that limit both political and material 
opportunity, and stigmatize entire communities. The phenomena that 
contribute to vulnerability are also collectively called symbolic 
violence.
95
  
The work of Richard Rothstein, a powerful critic of structures that 
condemn the racial underclass to permanent marginalization,
96
 has 
commented on the policies that created the structural violence of 
 
 91. Id. at 171–72. 
 92. Id. at 172. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Claudio Colaguori, Symbolic Violence and the Violation of Human Rights: Continuing 
Sociological Critique of Domination, 3 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 388, 
389 (2010) (examining Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “symbolic violence” and its critique of 
domination, describing it as “the subdued expression of a power that is normally and regularly 
operating in a mode of violence”).  
 96. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, SEGREGATION 
THEN, SEGREGATION SINCE: EDUCATION AND THE UNFINISHED MARCH 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.epi.org/publication/unfinished-march-public-school-segregation/; see also Richard 
Rothstein, Racial Segregation and Black Student Achievement, in EDUCATION, JUSTICE, AND 
DEMOCRACY 173 (Danielle Allen & Rob Reich eds., 2013) (discussing the achievement gap in 
general). 
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places like Ferguson.
97
 His analysis revealed that both private and 
public forces created the “segregated metropolises” that is St. Louis.98 
These include: 
 Racially explicit zoning decisions that designated specific 
ghetto boundaries within the city of St. Louis, turning 
black neighborhoods into slums; 
 Segregated public housing projects that separated blacks 
and whites who had previously lived in more integrated 
urban areas; 
 Restrictive covenants, excluding African Americans from 
white areas, that began as private agreements but then were 
adopted as explicit public policy; 
 Government subsidies for white suburban developments 
that excluded blacks, depriving African Americans of the 
20th century home-equity driven wealth gains reaped by 
whites; 
 Denial of adequate municipal services in ghettos, leading 
to slum conditions in black neighborhoods that reinforced 
 
 97. Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson, THE AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 5, 2014), 
http://prospect.org/article/making-ferguson-how-decades-hostile-policy-created-powder-keg/. 
A more powerful cause is the explicit intents of federal, state, and local governments 
to create racially segregated metropolises. The policies were mutually reinforcing . . . . 
In 1974, a federal appeals court concluded, “Segregated housing in the St. Louis 
metropolitan area was . . . in large measure the result of deliberate racial discrimination 
in the housing market by the real estate industry and by agencies of the federal, state, 
and local governments.” The Department of Justice stipulated to this truth but took no 
action in response. In 1980, a federal court ordered the state, county, and city 
governments to devise plans to integrate schools by integrating housing. Public 
officials ignored the order, devising only a voluntary busing plan to integrate schools, 
but not housing . . . . Although policies to impose segregation are no longer explicit, 
their effect endures. When we blame private prejudice and snobbishness for 
contemporary segregation, we not only whitewash history but avoid considering 
whether new policies might instead promote an integrated community.  
Id. 
 98. Id. 
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whites’ conviction that “blacks” and “slums” were 
synonymous; 
 Boundary, annexation, spot zoning, and municipal 
incorporation policies designed to remove African 
Americans from residence near white neighborhoods, or to 
prevent them from establishing residence near white 
neighborhoods; 
 Urban renewal and redevelopment programs to shift ghetto 
locations, under the guise of cleaning up those slums; 
 Government regulators’ tacit (and sometimes open) 
support for real estate and financial sector policies and 
practices that explicitly promoted residential segregation; 
 A government-sponsored dual labor market that made 
suburban housing less affordable for African Americans by 
preventing them from accumulating wealth needed to 
participate in homeownership.
99
 
In our current jurisprudence, we have rejected a broad 
constitutional obligation of racial and economic equality and 
rendered targeted racial measures presumptively unconstitutional. 
After Brown, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that policies 
with disproportionate negative effects on minorities should be strictly 
scrutinized for their validity and necessity.
100
 The Court extended 
Washington v. Davis to racialized enforcement of the criminal law in 
McCleskey v. Kemp.
101
 The consequences are dire: 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court should not strictly scrutinize 
procedures and/or criteria that disproportionately disqualified minorities from jobs. In that case, 
the Court decided that no such scrutiny was required unless minorities could prove that the 
procedures or criteria were adopted with the intent of excluding blacks (“We [the Court] have 
difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification for employment 
is nevertheless racially discriminatory and ‘denies any person. . .equal protection of the laws’ 
simply because a greater proportion of Negroes fail to qualify than members of other racial or 
ethnic groups.”). Id. at 245.  
 101. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
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In the absence of a vigorous constitutional principle that casts 
doubt on practices that perpetuate past segregation and 
discrimination, rules and practices that produce these 
outcomes, even if not squarely endorsed, acquire a gloss of 
constitutional legitimacy.  
This constitutional doctrine immunizes from judicial inquiry 
the cumulative effects of private and public decision-making, 
as well as the influence of wealth and poverty. As a result, the 
opportunity and inclusion aspirations of minorities are 
delegitimized. On the contrary, if constitutional doctrine 
condemned, or at a minimum rendered suspicious, facially-
neutral rules with disproportionate disadvantageous effects, the 
gloss of meritocracy that shores up these disparities would be 
undermined.
102
  
Washington and McCleskey lent “legitimacy to policies that 
disproportionately and cumulatively disadvantage minority 
groups, especially the poor.”103It can further be noted that 
“[t]he immunization of race-neutral policies from 
constitutional challenges lends credence to the assumption that 
the racial and economic stratification of society should be 
attributed to the failures of the disadvantaged rather than the 
unfairness of societal institutions and rules.”104 
Anti-affirmative action doctrine has also contributed to the legal 
infrastructure shoring up structural violence. The twenty-five year 
ambiguity of Regents of the Univ. of Cal. V. Bakke,
105
 as well as the 
presumption of unconstitutionality affirmed by majorities in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
106
 Grutter v. Bollinger,
107
 Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Dist.,
108
 and Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. 
 
 102. Linda S. Greene, From Brown to Grutter, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 101, 114 (2004). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US. 265 (1978). 
 106. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).) 
 107. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 108. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701 (2007).)  
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at Austin,
109
 add weight to the constitutional legitimacy of policies 
that routinely relegate minorities to the margins.
110
 The rhetoric of 
“special treatment” is a new stigma—though not a new charge for 
those who may have benefitted from targeted programs.
111
 Coupled 
with the charge that those who have historically enjoyed exclusive 
entitlement and privilege are now “innocent individuals,”112 new 
legal rhetoric reflects the historic charge of minority inferiority, 
traceable to Dred Scott v. Sandford.
113
 This legal framework forces 
efforts to eliminate structural violence-structural to political efforts 
unaided by constitutional command.  
B. Actual Violence 
Actual violence is reflected across a broad range of jurisprudence. 
From the court system’s approach to the death penalty and prision 
conditions to the use of deadly force by police in the streets, a 
structure of actual violence is firmly entrenched in American law.  
1. The Death Penalty 
The history of the death penalty and the courts in this country has 
a troubled history, and it is apparent from the early decisions of 
recent jurisprudence. In Furman v. Georgia. the Court addressed the 
matter of life and death in a slight and stiff formal paragraph.
114
 
Though the Court agreed that the imposition of the death penalty in 
the cases before it would violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment, the fractured decision said that the 
death penalty was not dead. On the merits, the per curiam opinion—a 
paragraph long—garnered the support of five Justices: Douglass, 
 
 109. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).  
 110. In these opinions a majority of the Court adopted activism—rather than deference—to 
voluntary measures of racial inclusion, increasing associated legal risks.  
 111. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).  
 112. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
 113. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 114. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall. All wrote separate 
concurring opinions.
115
  
Douglass wrote to emphasize that the discretionary systems before 
the court permitted discrimination against minorities, the poor, the 
illiterate, and mentally disabled that was “was incompatible with the 
idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 
‘cruel and unusual’ punishments.”116  
Stewart wrote to emphasize that Court had not rejected the death 
penalty, nor eliminated the possibility that it might be imposed on 
retributive grounds.
117
 For Stewart, the defect was the wanton and 
freakish imposition of the death penalty, not the per se 
unconstitutionality of the penalty, even if inflicted for retribution. 
118
  
White did not reject the death penalty per se but concluded that 
the Eight Amendment was violated by legislative schemes that 
provided so much discretion that the death penalty as a whole no 
longer served its legitimate legislative goals.
119
  
Only two justices—Brennan and Marshall—concluded that the 
death penalty violated the Eight amendment because of its severity 
and degradation, its arbitrary use, its virtual rejection by 
contemporary society, and the availability of an alternative 
punishment of imprisonment.
120
  
Marshall’s opinion, which concluded that the death penalty was 
per se unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment, was the most 
lengthy and comprehensive.
121
 It was framed with a frank 
acknowledgment that the particular crimes for which Furman had 
been convicted were “reprehensible,” but that the task before the 
court was not to condone the crime but to decide the constitutionality 
of the punishment of death.
122
 He noted that more than six hundred 
 
 115. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 307–
09 (Stewart, J., concurring); Id. at 312–13 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 305–06 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 116. Id. at 256–57 (Douglass, J., concurring).  
 117. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J, concurring).  
 118. Id. at 307–09 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 119. Id. at 312–13 (White, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. at 305–06 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 121. The opinion was 56 pages long, exclusive of appendices.  
 122. 408 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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lives were at stake in the case before the Court.
123
 Marshall reviewed 
the history of the death penalty and the history of decisions parsing 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment
124—a history that 
demonstrated that “evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society”125 were the measure of the 
constitutionality of the penalty.
126
 Justice Marshall disagreed with the 
Court’s view of the death penalty’s purpose of deterrence and 
retribution.
127
 Marshall’s view was that the purpose of retribution was 
not justified as an avenue to visit society’s moral outrage. Instead the 
judiciary must serve as a buffer against the imposition of 
unconstitutional—though popular—punishments.128 In addition, he 
insisted that the government could not just carry out such an affair in 
a consistent and non-discriminatory manner.
129
 
Justice Brennan also rejected the death penalty:  
Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there 
is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection 
by contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no 
reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more 
effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. 
The function of these principles is to enable a court to 
determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. 
Death, quite simply, does not.
130
 
The dissenters included Chief Justice Burger, who wrote for 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, to emphasize that the legislature 
must play a primary role in the choice of punishment,
131
 that the 
decision of the Court in Furman was a limited one which left the 
death penalty available as a permissive punishment,
132
 and that 
 
 123. Id. at 316–17 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 322–29 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 125. Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 342–43, 347 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 128. Id. at 331 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 129. Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).  
 130. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
 132. Id.  
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continued popular support for the death penalty undercut any 
arguments that evolving standards of decency required its demise.
133
  
Although the Supreme Court as a whole has not embraced 
Marshall’s view that the death penalty is inconsistent with the Eighth 
Amendment, other Justices have embraced that point of view. In 
1994, Justice Blackmun, dissenting from a denial of certiorari in a 
Texas case, concluded in terms almost identical to the views Justice 
Marshall consistently expressed, that the American death penalty was 
constitutionally broken
134
: 
  From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the 
machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have 
endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority 
of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that 
would lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the 
death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle the 
Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been 
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally 
and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death 
penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me 
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive 
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent 
constitutional deficiencies.
135
 
After a lengthy explanation of the evolution of his journey from 
morality concerns to constitutional ones, Justice Blackmun cited to 
Justice Marshall:  
Perhaps one day this Court will develop procedural rules or 
verbal formulas that actually will provide consistency, fairness, 
and reliability in a capital sentencing scheme. I am not 
optimistic that such a day will come. I am more optimistic, 
though, that this Court eventually will conclude that the effort 
to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness “in the 
 
 133. Id. at 385–86 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
 134. Callins v. Collins, 998 F. 2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 135. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to failure that it—and 
the death penalty— must be abandoned altogether.” Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in judgment). I may not live to see that day, but I have faith 
that eventually it will arrive. The path the Court has chosen 
lessens us all. I dissent.
136
 
 In 2008, Justice Stevens same to the same conclusion shortly 
before his retirement in Baze v. Rees, wherein he expressed his view 
that the death penalty was unconstitutional.
137
 Although Justice 
Stevens concurred in the judgment of the Court to uphold the 
constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol on stare 
decisis grounds, he spelled out the reasons for his decision regarding 
the penalty, relying on the grounds that Justice Marshall set down in 
his 1972 Furman concurrence.
138
 He concluded that the justifications 
for the death penalty—deterrence and retribution—were simply 
vengeance objectives, that the risk of error was too great, and that the 
discriminatory application of the death penalty was inevitable.
139
 
In the recent case of Glossip v. Gross, questions of retribution and 
arbitrariness were never far from the surface of the discourse.
140
 In 
that case, the Court held that a new lethal injection protocol, adopted 
by Oklahoma after a botched execution,
141
 did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
142
 
The condemned inmates attempted to establish that there were less 
painful means of execution using alternative drugs, but the Court 
upheld the district court’s rejection of those alternatives because the 
District Court found that those drugs were unavailable.
143
   
 
 136. Id. at 1159. 
 137. 553 U.S. 35, 71 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 138. Id. at 41. 
 139. Id. at 82–86 (Stevens , J., concurring in the judgment). 
 140. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). 
 141. Id. at 2734.  
 142. Id. at 2742–44.  
 143. Id. at 2726, 2738.  
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The dissenters, Breyer joined by Ginsburg,
144
 and Sotomayor, 
joined by Ginsburg, Breyer and Kagan,
145
 disagreed with this 
reasoning. They raised multiple points of disagreement, but there was 
an underlying thread throughout their opinions: who bears the risk 
that a method of execution will inflict cruel and unusual punishment, 
the inmate facing execution, or the state seeking to impose the 
ultimate penalty? 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence dripped disdain for the constitutional 
arguments on behalf of the condemned. The retributive element of 
Justice Scalia’s dissent is clear. He noted; 
We federal judges live in a world apart from the vast majority 
of Americans. After work, return to homes in placid suburbia 
or to high-rise co-ops with guards at the door. We are not 
confronted with the threat of violence that is ever present in 
many Americans everyday lives. The suggestion that the 
incremental deterrence effects of capital punishment does not 
seem “significant” reflects, it seems to me, a let-them-eat-cake 
oblivious to the needs of others. Let the people decide how 
much incremental deterrence is appropriate.
146
  
 Justice Thomas’ concurring opinion, in which he focused 
relentlessly on the description of the crimes committed emphasized 
retribution as well. He wrote that there were no cases during his time 
on the Court that did not merit the death penalty and that “amnesty 
came in the form of unfounded claims”.147 The best way for the Court 
to rid it self of “disparate outcomes . . . is for the Court to stop 
making up Eighth Amendment claims in it ceaseless quest to end the 
death penalty through undemocratic means.”148 
The Breyer dissent, joined by Ginsburg, focused on the evidence 
that the administration of the death penalty is flawed and fraught with 
human risk.
149
 Although Breyer does not hold that the death penalty 
 
 144. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J, dissenting).  
 145. Id. at 2780 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 146. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 2755 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 2755–57, 2759–64 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol49/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]   Before and After Michael Brown  33 
 
 
violates the Constitution, he states the case for that conclusion. He 
notes that when the Supreme Court upheld the death penalty in its 
Gregg decision in 1976 and the accompanying decisions, it did so 
with the assumption that the statutes “contain safeguards sufficient to 
ensure that the penalty would be applied reliably and arbitrarily.”150 
Since then, Breyer noted, the circumstances have changed: 
Today’s administration of the death penalty involves three 
fundamental constitutional defects: (1) serious unreliability, 
(2) arbitrariness in application, and (3) unconscionably long 
delays that undermine the death penalty’s penological purpose. 
Perhaps as a result, (4) most places within the United 
States abandoned its use . . . those changes, taken together with 
my own 20 years of experience on this Court, that lead me to 
believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely 
constitutes a legally prohibited “cruel and unusual 
punishmen[t].”151 
 The dissent of Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsberg, 
Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan join,
152
 contrasts sharply with the 
concurrences of Justices Scalia
153
 and Thomas.
154
 Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent focuses on the courts approval of a drug protocol 
that the Justices believe “poses a substantial, constitutionally 
intolerable risk” that it will impose excruciating pain on the inmate in 
enduring execution, pain that might be masked by the other drugs that 
make up the cocktail.
155
 The dissenters believe that the decision of the 
District Court to credit “scientifically unsupported and implausible 
testimony”156 as well as the court’s requirement that the condemned 
inmates identify a less painful alternative drug for their own death 
 
 150. Id. at 2755 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
 151. Id. at 2756 (Breyer, J, dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 2780 (Sotomayor, J., dissnenting). 
 153. Id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 154. Id. at 2750 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 155. Id. at 2781 (Sotomayor, J., dissnenting). 
 156. Id.  
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creates the risk that the condemned “will suffer . . . the chemical 
equivalent of being burned at the stake.”157  
 The contrast between the dissenters and the majority’s view of the 
role of the court in safeguarding life is also evident in their 
contrasting views on the entitlement of condemned inmates to 
judicial protection and dignity. In one respect, the difference of 
opinion on the question of dignity comes down to a difference of 
opinion on the relevance of vengeance and retribution as the 
prolonged solitary confinement that accompanies a death sentence 
that may or may not be carried out. A portion of Breyer’s dissent 
focused on the documented dehumanizing effects of the prolonged 
solitary confinement that inevitably accompanies a sentence of death 
which may or may not be carried out.
158
 Justice Thomas responds 
with a detailed description of by the heinous murders committed by 
those whose humanity Breyer touts.
159
 Justice Scalia argues that the 
dissenters desire for more deterrence certainty would be an exercise 
in mathematical futility that would deprive potential victims of their 
protection from life-threatening crime.
160
 
The key difference in the Justices point of view lies in their 
willingness—or unwillingness—to tolerate the risk of mistake, 
arbitrariness, or innocence, in the imposition of the death penalty. It 
is the point to view that these concerns do not constitute significant 
constitutional risk that is an important part our constitutional 
jurisprudence of violence. 
2. Prison Conditions and Indifference to Humanity 
A recent key Supreme Court case on constitutional standards for 
prison conditions, Farmer v. Brennan, presents a paradigm similar to 
those involving deadly force as well as those involving the imposition 
of the death penalty.
161
 In Farmer, prison officials initially housed 
 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 2765 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 159. Id. at 2753–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 160. Id. at 2749 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 161. 511 US 825(1994). 
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transgendered man in administrative segregation.
162
 After prison 
authorities transferred the transgendered prisoner to the general 
population, other inmates beat and raped him in his cell.
163
 The 
question in Farmer was whether prison officials violated the Eighth 
Amendment standard through “deliberate indifference” in regards “to 
his safety” when they exposed him to sexual violence.164 The Court 
concluded that deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of the 
serious harm is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.
165
 
But in order for the Court to conclude that the Eighth Amendment 
was violated, it would be necessary to demonstrate that prison 
officials disregarded a risk of harm of which they were subjectively 
aware—in this instance the inmate would need to demonstrate that 
prison officials knew that he would be raped and brutalized, and that 
they disregarded that knowledge to the detriment of the incarcerated 
transgender man.
166
 
The standards which impose the risk of harm on inmates are 
exacerbated by the racialized conditions of incarceration that exist in 
the United States. Those conditions have been documented in 
numerous studies and in the records of prison condition litigation that 
states the potential for abuse of inmates under such lenient and 
forgiving standards.
167
 Recently, tragedies such as the suicide of a 
teenager once held in solitary confinement at Rikers Island have 
exposed the poisonous combination of race, discretion and secrecy in 
the administration of prison facilities.
168
 Although it is promising that 
both judges the Department of Justice are beginning to aggressively 
address violence and abuse in the context of prisons, it seems clear 
 
 162. Id. at 830. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 832. 
 165. Id. at 836. 
 166. Id. at 838. 
 167. Peter Wagner & Daniel Kopf, The Racial Geography of Mass Incarceration, PRISON 
POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 2015), http://www.prisonpolicy.org/racialgeography/report.html; ANN 
CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013 (2014), 
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.  
 168. Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers Island for 3 
Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-commits-
suicide.html?_r=0. 
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that systemic abuse over years seems to be the prerequisite for the 
ablation of the violence that is an integral part of mass incarceration 
disproportionately affecting Blacks, minorities, and poor in the united 
states today. 
These permissive standards and attitudes demonstrate that official 
violence is permissible, and that due to disparities in the exposure of 
Black minorities to the prison system and to the criminal system, the 
effect of violence on our jurisprudence both pervasive and 
cumulative. 
3. Deadly Force 
Several areas of law come together when police use deadly force. 
With respect to criminal liability, prosecutions are rare and the 
circumstances rarely lead to conviction.
169
 Recent police shootings of 
unarmed men, almost all Black, combine both unambiguous lack of 
threat to police officers and the use of multiple rounds, when deadly 
force seems unnecessary to protect either bystanders or police. There 
is a different dynamic at play, a busy intersection of stigmas—race, 
gender, age, hyper-criminalization, unemployment, marginal housing, 
and class and racial segregation—all creating circumstances in which 
the use of force may be targeted at a discrete stigmatized group in 
society, a group few will champion or defend.
170
 As the New York 
Times Editorial Board said, these cases “show how the presumption 
of criminality, poverty, and social isolation threatens lives every day 
in all corners of this country.”171 
The indifference to the humanity of those suspected or convicted 
of criminality accounts for the doctrine that all but immunizes these 
all-too-frequent incidents from both visibility and redress. The 
presumptions of legitimate government action, rather than the high 
cost of abuse of governmental power, empowers “a jurisprudence of 
 
 169. See Zusha Elinson & Joe Palazzolo, Police Rarely Criminally Charged for On-Duty 
Shootings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2014, 7:22 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/police-rarely-
criminally-charged-for-on-duty-shootings-1416874955.  
 170. Editorial, Forcing Black Men Out of Society, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/opinion/sunday/forcing-black-men-out-of-society.html?_r=0. 
 171. Id.  
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death” in which actual violence plays a symbolic and exemplary role 
in the maintenance of structural violence.
172
 It is a fetishization of 
violence that constantly reoccurs.
173
  
There are three major cases regarding deadly force and civil 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which provides a cause of action for 
violations of the constitution or federal law against person acting 
under color of state law.
174
 They are Tennessee v. Garner,
175
 
Plumhoff v. Rickard,
176
 and City and County of San Francisco v. 
Sheehan.
177
  
Tennessee v. Garner defined the terms of the legal debate over the 
use of deadly force with two competing ideas—that killing an 
unarmed suspect violates the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable 
seizure and that there are circumstances in which the police action to 
use deadly force is a reasonable seizure. Because of this it forms the 
backbone modern jurisprudence commonly implicated in police 
shootings. The Court noted that “[t]he use of deadly force to prevent 
the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is 
constitutionally unreasonable.”178 It ultimately held, however, that 
under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may use deadly force 
against an unarmed fleeing felon when “the officer has probable 
cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officer or others.”179 The dissent in 
Garner offered a counterargument, written by Justice O’Connor and 
joined by Justices Burger and Rehnquist, that the interests of Society 
may be served by the execution of the suspect.
180
 All deadly force 
cases potentially straddle this divide. Where police killings occur in 
 
 172. Professor Margeret Radin used the phrase in her 1978 article on the death penalty. See 
Margeret Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 126 PENN. L. REV. 989 (1978).  
 173. James Tyner & Joshua Inwood, Violence as Fetish: Geography, Marxism, and 
Dialects, 38 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 771 (2014).  
 174. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 175. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 176. 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
 177. 135 S. Ct. 1764 (2015.) 
 178. 471 U.S. at 11. 
 179. Id. at 3.  
 180. Id. at 26–28.  
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circumstances where there is no possible harm to the officer or 
imminent threat to the public, the implicit question is always whether 
the prevention of imminent threat rationale is sound or is in effect one 
sounding in “just desserts” or retribution in exchange for “being” a 
suspect. 
The more recent Plumhoff v. Rickard sheds light on recent 
applications of Garner. In Plumhoff, the Court held that police acted 
reasonably in firing fifteen times at a driver and passenger following 
a high-speed chase.
181
 Nodding to Garner, the Court recognized that 
assessing the reasonableness of a particular seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of 
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against 
the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”182 The inquiry is 
an analysis of “the totality of the circumstances.”183 Though the 
standard is the objective reasonableness of a particular seizure, the 
analysis requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests the court 
reiterated that it would analyze the question from the perspective “of 
a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 
hindsight,” a quotation citing to Graham.184 Courts must “allow for 
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second 
judgments—in rapid circumstances that are chance, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving, about the amount of force that is necessary in a 
particular situation.”185  
The Court emphasized the extended nature of the pursuit, stating 
that “[t]he chase in this case exceeded 100 miles per hour and lasted 
over five minutes.”186 The Court concluded that a “reasonable police 
officer could have concluded that Rickard was intent on resuming his 
flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would once again pose 
a deadly threat for others on the road.”187 Thus, the court concluded 
 
 181. Plumhoff, 134 S. Ct. at 2014–16. 
 182. Id. at 2018. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 2021. 
 187. Id. at 2022. 
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that “Rickard’s flight posed a grave public safety risk, and here, as in 
Scott, the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that 
risk.”188  
Rickard also unsuccessfully contended the police officer acted 
unreasonably in firing a total of fifteen shots.
189
 Justice Alito said, 
“[i]f police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a 
severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until 
the threat has ended . . . ‘If lethal force is justified, officers are taught 
to keep shooting until the threat is over.’”190 
Finally, the decision of Sheehan v. City and County of San 
Francisco reinforces the judicial deference to police officers who use 
deadly force, even against ineffectually armed mentally ill persons.
191
 
In the Sheehan, the Court adhered to a standard of immunity that 
forbids judicial second-guessing of police judgments to use deadly 
force in a circumstance in which they might have retreated and left a 
mentally ill person confined. This case is important, because some 
have observed that many police shootings of unarmed or ineffectively 
armed people involved the mentally ill.
192
 
Sheehan was a person suffering from schizophrenia who lived in a 
group home for the mentally ill and had stopped taking her 
medicine.
193
 After attempting to refuse a social worker entry to her 
room and yelling that she had a knife, the social worker indicated that 
Sheehan was a threat to others and requested police.
194
 When police 
entered the room, Sheehan grabbed a knife and the officers deployed 
pepper spray; Sheehan initially refused to drop the knife but after she 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 2016. 
 191. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
 192. Dierdre Fulton, In Latest Police Killing of Black Man, Victim was both unarmed and 
Mentally Ill, COMMON DREAMS (Mar. 10, 2015); http://www.commondreams.org/news/ 
2015/03/10/latest-police-killing-black-man-victim-was-both-unarmed-and-mentally-ill; Erick 
Ortiz, Fatal Shooting of New Mexico Man Sparks ‘Killer Cop’ Protest, NBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 
2014, 9:10 PM); Gale Holland et al., On Skid Row, Grief and Anger After Fatal LAPD Shooting 
of Homeless Man, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ 
la-me-ln-on-skid-row-empathy-for-homeless-man-fatally-shot-20150302-story.html#page=1.  
 193. See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1769. 
 194. Id. at 1769–70. 
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dropped it, both officers shot her multiple times.
195
 Sheehan brought a 
civil suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as well as 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.
196
  
The Supreme Court concluded that the officers who shot Sheehan 
were entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that the officers had 
not violated the “clearly established” standard set by Plumhoff when 
considering whether the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth 
Amendment.
197
 The Supreme Court concluded that the officers acted 
reasonably when they forced open the door, and also that they acted 
reasonably when they pepper sprayed her initially.
198
 
In considering whether the officers acted unreasonably when they 
decided to use potentially deadly force, the Court wrote that “[t]he 
real question, then, is whether, despite these dangerous 
circumstances, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when 
they decided to reopen Sheehan’s door rather than attempting to 
accommodate her disability.”199 The Supreme Court concluded that 
because there was no clear case law stating that their chosen use of 
force violated the Fourth Amendment, and because Plumhoff 
permitted the officers to protect themselves by firing multiple rounds, 
their action did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
200
  
The Court said that Sheehan was dangerous, recalcitrant, and law-
breaking, and that, even if the officers “misjudged the situation,” 
Sheehan could not “establish a Fourth Amendment violation based 
merely on bad tactics that result in a deadly confrontation that could 
have been avoided.”201 Because there was no clear precedent in the 
Court’s view establishing that the entry under the circumstances was 
unreasonable, the officers lacked fair notice that their contact would 
be unreasonable.
202
 
 
 195. Id. at 1771. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 1774–78. 
 198. Id. at 1775. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1768–69. 
 201. Id. at 1777 (citing Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 
2014) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Billington v. Smith, 292 
F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 202. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777. 
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The fact that the officers did not follow their training was also 
irrelevant. Even if they do so, they still retain qualified immunity if 
“a reasonable officer could have believed that his conduct was 
justified.”203 On summary judgment, “a jury does not automatically 
get to second-guess these life-and-death decisions, even though a 
plaintiff has an expert and a plausible claim that the situation could 
better have been handled differently.”204 They would have voted to 
dismiss both legal issues as certiorari improvidently granted, on the 
ground that the petitioner city engaged in bait and switch tactics by 
asking the court to grant cert on “whether title II [of the ADA] 
applies to the arrest of violent and mentally ill individuals” while 
briefing only the question how it applied under the circumstances of 
this case, where the plaintiff threatened officers with a weapon.
205
 
Police killings of mentally ill persons are not deterred by this 
permissive decision. 
This tactic deprived the court of the “opportunity to consider, and 
settle, a controverted question of law that has divided the Circuits.”206 
The Court’s approach is understandable on one level; as it has said 
multiple times, it does not want the judiciary second-guessing the 
street judgments of police officers.
207
 Yet others have observed that 
the Court has rejected substantive objections to police officer’s 
 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216 n.6 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
judgment). Scalia and Kagan concurred in part and dissented in part. 
 205. 135 S. Ct. at 1779.  
 206. Id. at 1779 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 207. Id. at 1777. The most recent Supreme Court cases on immunities does not depart from 
Scott nor Plumhoff in its deference to police judgments that result in the death of individuals. 
Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015). The per curiam emphasizes that Garner’s broad 
language affords qualified immunity as long as there is no precedent forbidding a specific use 
of force in the specific circumstances of the shooting. Id. The court rejected the argument that 
the officer had a duty to employ a ‘less lethal alternative’ in light of the fugitive’s prior 
threatening behavior and his “high-speed vehicular flight”, noting that the question was whether 
under all the circumstances it was “beyond debate” that the officer acted unreasonably. Id. at 
309. Justice Sotomayor dissented. Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). She opined that the 
Court should reject civil immunity for deadly force when an officer had a less lethal option 
available, Id. at 314, characterizing the Court’s decision as encouragement to a “rogue” officer 
and the establishment “of the culture…to use deadly force for no discernible gain. . . . By 
sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing, the Court renders the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment hollow” she admonished. Id. at 316. 
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decisions on due process grounds, while constructing a Fourth 
Amendment analysis that defers entirely to police judgment in the 
absence of positive statements of law. In this gap—between clearly 
established violations of the Fourth Amendment and new fact 
situations involving dead or severely injured people—lies the broken 
content of a mandate that the State not take life without compelling 
justification.  
Thoughtfully, some lower courts have pushed back on post-
Garner permissiveness with respect to police killings of incapacitated 
suspects. In Brockington v. Boykins, a Fourth Circuit panel found no 
justification for a second series of shots fired by a police officer 
against a suspect who was obviously disabled by the first volley.
208
 
The panel discussed the rules of qualified immunity
209
 including the 
rule that conduct that qualifies for qualified immunity “does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.”210 Boykins argued that “there 
needs to be a clear bright-line separating allowable actions from 
forbidden ones” and that conduct not specifically and previously 
found to violate the Fourth Amendment ought to qualify for qualified 
immunity.
211
 The Fourth Circuit responded that the fact that the exact 
conduct has not been found previously unconstitutional does not 
immunize the officer’s conduct from civil liability.212 The Court 
observed that Tennessee v. Garner made the point “that deadly force 
was not generally justified against a suspect who did not pose an 
immediate threat.”213 The court plainly stated that “it is just common 
sense that continuing to shoot someone who is already incapacitated 
is not justified under these circumstances.”214 
The regime for the possible redress of excessive force makes the 
loss or preservation of life in police encounters dependent on the 
 
 208. Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 209. Id. at 506. 
 210. Id. (citing Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshall University, 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999))).  
 211. 637 F.3d at 507. 
 212. Id. at 507–08. 
 213. Id. at 508 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). 
 214. 637 F. 3d at 508. 
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judgment of an individual officer in a framework in which killing is 
permissible unless it has been strictly forbidden by prior precedent or 
limited by individual local police authority. This is sanctioned 
arbitrariness in the imposition of death that has affected Black 
communities around the nation. 
IV. BEYOND A JURISPRUDENCE OF VIOLENCE TOWARD 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Our jurisprudence of violence includes approval, even celebration, 
of actual violence. It is the combination of immunity, weak criminal 
penalties, cultures of secrecy, and unfettered power through 
technology and militarization that renders the meaningful discussion 
of restraint on police violence impossible in the current legal 
framework. Our challenge is to find a meta-framework that aids our 
understanding and contributes to a transformation. There are several 
possibilities, including rethinking the regime of deference to police 
judgment, a moral and ethical framework for policing, and the 
elimination of the circumstances of economic discrimination, spatial 
discrimination, and hyper-criminalization in order to eliminate 
material and stigmatic disparities that that weaken communities and 
make them vulnerable to despair and crimes of survival.  
A. Rethinking Deference to “Reasonable” Police Officers 
A recent Mireille Hildebrandt review of a book on police power 
offers useful insights.
215
 She reviewed the contributions to a 2006 
volume on policing which focused in part on processes necessary for 
the security of the contemporary state.
216
 Her observations on the 
essays provide a framework for policing in the context of the 
contemporary administrative state. She took up the question of the 
“Undefinability and the Unlimited Nature of the Power of Police” to 
 
 215. Miereille Hildebrandt, Governance, Governmentality, Police, and Justice: A New 
Science of Police?, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 557 (2008) (reviewing MARKUS D. DUBBER & MARIANA 
VALVERDE, THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE (2006)). 
 216. Id.  
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probe arguments about the legitimacy of limitations on police 
authority, situating police authority initially in the context of 
administrative functions and the necessity of discretion
217
:  
Though its workings can be enumerated—from water 
management to civil registration, traffic regulation, taxation, 
social security, etc.—in the end, its scope cannot be 
determined. The productive dimension ventures into the future 
. . . always on the verge of the unknown that must be mastered 
to prevent mishaps and to create new opportunities.
218
 
Thus, we may assume for purposes of this discussion, as does 
Hildebrandt, that as to the police power generally, and also as to its 
potentially most lethal iteration, the police require a degree of 
discretion in order to operate in the realm of future “unknown[s]”. 219  
Current doctrine theorizes limitations on policing but correlatively 
shuns specificity, and arguably celebrates the margins of excess, 
providing justifications for borderline barbaric conduct. The 
approaches are grounded in a normative of police benevolence and 
the dangerousness of their world. The concern, often expressed, is 
that the scrutiny of particular police decisions after the fact would 
cripple law enforcement. Put another way, Hildebrandt noted that 
those who espouse police work are often in the company of those 
who “claim that it is unlimited by definition and for that reason, 
cannot be limited.”220 She noted that several contributors to the 
volume “rightly reject a formal definition of what they mean by 
‘police,’” not implying that “anything goes as far as the meaning of 
‘police’ is concerned,” but rather that the scope of policing invokes 
“contested conceptions” with “evaluative dimensions” and contextual 
 
 217. Id. at 557–58.  
 218. Id. at 567. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. 
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dimensions.
221
 Here, too Hillebrandt tackles the conflict of the 
dynamic needs police respond to and potentially unlimited authority: 
In relation to the power of police, I would argue that this 
power is underdetermined because of its inherent need for 
discretion but, therefore, not necessarily unlimited as some of 
the authors claim. The idea that the power of police is 
unlimited must not be conflated with the issue of conceptual 
undefinability. The notion of being unlimited draws on the 
proposition that the law depends on the power to police . . . 
because of its supposedly unrestricted discretionary power.
222
  
In this sense, she frames a classic “chicken or the egg” problem. The 
question is one involving a query about fundamental philosophical 
primacy. Here, it is whether police power precedes the state and if so 
to what extent, or whether despite its pedigree it must flow from the 
state and be subjected to fundamental limitations on the state. 
Hillebrandt notes that Roman philosophers argued that certain 
bodies were unprotected by the existence of legal subjectivity and 
thus not subjects of the state. She notes that current reasoning about 
groups employs this non-subjectivity trope in which certain groups 
like “illegal immigrants, illegal enemy combatants . . . are in fact . . . 
to an extent no longer compatible with the notion of the human 
person.”223 She further describes that as to these objects, and also as 
to state power:  
To suspend the rule of law . . . the sovereign is both inside and 
outside the domain of law: the choice to define a situation as 
an emergency is his own and cannot be contested as this 
contestation depends on the (re)instatement of the rule of law. 
In other words, the law does not rule, the sovereign rules . . . . 
[This] legal discourse is seen as a way to legitimize 
 
 221. Id. at 568.  
 222. Id. at 568–69. 
 223. Id. at 569. 
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disciplinary practices that follow a logic inherently opposed to 
the fundamental principles of law.
224
 
Further on in the review, she sets up the question which flows from 
the previous proposition, whether even if organized society depends 
on a monopoly of violence, it remains crucial to determine whether in 
constitutional society, there must be normative limitations on the 
monopolization of violence for those who act on its behalf. This is 
not formally rejected in existing doctrine, but it is practically rejected 
by decisions that provide broad latitude to police and prison officials 
to deploy violence in pursuit of submission and sanction. 
Hildebrandt’s observations seem to sum up the dilemma we face:  
In as far as modern law depends on the monopoly of violence, 
the sovereign seems to be both inside and outside of the law. 
But, as far as constitutional democracy is at stake, the 
sovereign is bound by the dictates of the law in deciding about 
the state of emergency. The law will then contain rules about 
which subdivision of the sovereign prepares the decision, 
about the criteria that must be fulfilled to declare the 
emergency, as well as rules about its duration and ex ante and 
post hoc accountability. These dictates of the law will indeed 
leave room for discretion: like the power of police, the law is 
underdetermined, but—like the power of police in 
constitutional democracy—not indeterminate or unlimited.225 
The current regime eschews legal responsibility in the absence of 
clear legal rules, and yet court decisions articulate broad areas of 
discretion in the use of deadly force, an irony in light of the legal 
processes and years of appeals required before the state sets official 
execution date.  
 
 224. Id. at 569–70.  
 225. Id. at 594.  
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B. Moral and Ethical Approaches 
Do current remedies provide a framework for the end of a 
structure of violence, both actual and symbolic, that would reduce the 
vulnerability of poor minority communities to police violence? 
Current events do demonstrate that the problem of excessive force is 
not solely a problem of race but one in which multifaceted 
vulnerability is heightened by distance and discord between 
communities and their police departments. The role of some police 
departments in the economic subjugation of the minority 
communities they police has made visible the link between policing 
and structural economic despair of minority communities.
226
 
A useful framework would include community 
acknowledgements of the complexity of policing as well as the 
significance of its inherent challenges to its fundamental legitimacy. 
The power to inflict fatal or near fatal bodily injury is unlike other 
examples of discretion. Hence Hillibrandt’s point that the notion of 
near unchecked power must be examined and openly resisted. Cohen 
and Feldberg focused on the importance of the “moral dimension” of 
police work.
227
 While police work may involve matters of minor 
consequence, they noted “that in most generic moments, police can 
confront the question of whether to take human life.”228 These 
occasions, they observed, are nonetheless exceedingly important as 
the decisions sharpen the focus on the very fundamental idea of the 
social contract.
229
 Felberg and Cohen emphasized that the idea of the 
social contract “lies at the very foundation of our society’s social 
arrangement.”230 The social contract is, in the abstract, an idea some 
would argue is far too lofty a ground upon which to lay the 
 
 226. See Joseph Shapiro, In Ferguson, Court Fines and Fees Fuel Anger, NPR (Aug. 25, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger; 
see also INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 40 (2015), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/ 
04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
 227. HOWARD S. COHEN & MICHAEL FELDBERG, POWER AND RESTRAINT: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF POLICE WORK 4–5 (1991).  
 228. Id. at 16. 
 229. Id. at 24. 
 230. Id. 
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opportunity to take a life, but embedded in a structural framework out 
of which might be constructed a new foundation for accountable 
policing. The idea has powerful transformative potential. Thus, the 
social contract requires “high standards of ethical policing. . . . Police 
must provide full access to their services to enforce that their powers 
heed and are used as a public trust and will not be abused.”231 
C. Increased Transparency: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice 
1. Transparency and Morality 
The establishment of an ethical and moral foundation is 
impossible without transparency, which is a foundation for the 
accountability that would strengthen the social contract as the 
foundation of police authority. Litigation over police practices, of 
course, does result in transparency; however, limited federal 
government resources suggest that adversarial processes may yield 
visible, albeit anecdotal, changes rather than pervasive structural 
reform.
232
 
2. “Tools of Justice” 
The role that technology has played in the renewed public fervor 
to curb illegal police practices was anticipated a decade ago. It is 
ironic that, in a prescient comment written ten years ago, Matthew 
Thurlow remarked on “video cameras as tools of justice” and in so 
 
 231. Id. at 145; see also Kevin A. Elliott & Jocelyn M. Pollock, The Ethics of Force: Duty, 
Principle, and Morality, in LAW ENFORCEMENT ETHICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
231, 248 (Brian D. Fitch ed., 2014). 
[E]ach decision to use force has significant ethical and moral implications for the 
officer, has agency and the community at large . . . Even when the application of 
deadly force is legally and ethically justified, such incidents have polarized 
communities, damaged the public trust, and left those most in need for police services 
suspicious and cynical. 
Id. 
 232. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 
(2014). 
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doing explored issues that have become salient today.
233
 His topics 
included video recordings “in interrogation rooms, in patrol cars, and 
with hand-held cameras.”234 In the main, the comment focused on the 
recording of confessions, statements, and interrogations.
235
 He noted, 
as had others, that the “totality of the circumstances standards” for 
the suppression of coerced confessions had been an uneven tool for 
the suppression of confessions obtained under coercive 
circumstances. The Supreme Court’s decisions in extreme cases—
“lynching, whipping and torture”236 and multiday interrogations237 
were arguably as necessary to a minimally civilized society as they 
were to judicial constitutional relevance. Other cases falling short of 
these extremes yielded unanimous opinions authored by judicial 
champions of defendants’ rights.238 Noting that depth of the debate 
over the importance of the admission of defendant statements, 
Thurlow concluded that the Court would never exclude confessions 
in a categorical set of circumstances and that best approach would be 
videotaping to “allow courts to properly assess the totality of the 
circumstances in which a confession has been obtained.”239 
Furthermore, his comments on cameras in police cars and other 
recordings were insightful in an era not dominated by the cell phone 
as default camera. He observed then that “[v]ideo cameras in every 
police car in America may soon be a reality.”240  
At the time he wrote, in 2005, although no court had held that due 
process required videotaping of interrogations,
241
 some law 
enforcement agencies had already adopted recording of 
 
 233. Matthew D. Thurlow, Comment, Lights, Camera, Action: Video Cameras as Tools of 
Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 771, 771 (2005).  
 234. Id. at 774. 
 235. Id. at 771–72 
 236. Id. at 782 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)). 
 237. Thurlow, supra note 233, at 782 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)). 
 238. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 31, 322 (1959) (admitting confession after all 
night custodial interrogation of suspect by fourteen officers)  
 239. Thurlow, supra note 233, 783–84. 
 240. Id. at 795.  
 241. Id. at 784. 
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interrogations.
242
 Some did so as a matter of course, and other did so 
on a discretionary basis.
243
  
With the evolution of mobile videotaping technology, why not 
extend the protective and evaluative benefits to every police 
encounter with civilians?
244
  
If cheap and easy-to-operate electronic recording devices have 
made videotaping feasible outside of the station house, it 
makes little sense for courts and legislatures to afford suspects 
one constitutional protection in the back of a patrol car while 
neglecting other, recognized constitutional rights. 
 Patrol car and officer-mounted cameras are the natural 
extension of any recording policy. 
245
  
By 2000, 50 percent of police cars in America had video cameras; the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police noted that every state 
agency had some video cameras in their patrol cars.
246
 “[E]xcessive 
use of force, dangerous police pursuits, and abusive detain suspects 
have driven many police agencies to install these cameras.”247 In his 
comment, Thurlow spoke of the development of “hands-free” 
wireless voice activated miniaturized technologies that might allow 
quality recording.
248
 
The comment noted a number of objections to videotaping that 
mirror current concerns. One concern was privacy for both officers as 
well as subjects—witnesses, bystanders.249 Other objections include 
the inevitable technological problems, including concerns about 
malfunctioning microphones and recording equipment.
250
 On the 
positive side, a benefit of recording would be its use as a tool in 
 
 242. Id. at 790.  
 243. Id. at 790–91.  
 244. Id. at 794–97.  
 245. Id. at 794.  
 246. Id. at 795 (referencing Candice Combs, Cameras Go on Patrol with Chattanooga 
Police, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Aug. 27, 2003, at B1).  
 247. Thurlow, supra note 233, 795. 
 248. Id. at 796. 
 249. Id. at 801–02. 
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officer training and monitoring.
251
 Cellphones—particularly 
smartphones—have become tools of transparency and have 
established a powerful counter narrative.  
This prediction from a decade earlier has become a reality. On the 
question of whether citizens have a First Amendment right to record 
police, there is robust debate. Four United States Courts of Appeals 
have so concluded
252
 and the DOJ has so advocated,
253
 but that fact 
does not deter police officers from arresting those who record police 
treatment of young Black men.
254
 Nor does it deter lawmakers, even 
those in cities in which racialized deadly force has resulted in consent 
orders, from proposing to ban citizen filming of police officers.
255
  
Although far from perfect, recordings can add a layer of 
protection. Video evidence rarely tells the complete story, as the 
recent events in Baltimore involving the death of Freddie Gray 
illustrated.
256
 Even where video evidence can be used, there are often 
timeline gaps and questions of interpretation. But technology does 
create the possibility of a record that will be illuminated by one 
 
 251. Id. at 810–11. 
 252. Adkins v. Limtiaco, 537 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir. 2013); Am. Civil Liberties Union of 
Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); 
Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 
436 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Letter from Johnathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, 
Dep’t of Justice, to Mark H. Grimes, Baltimore Police Dep’t, et al. (May 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Sharp_ltr_5-14-12.pdf. 
 253. See Statement of Interest of the United States, Garcia v. Montgomery Cnty., 
Maryland, No. 8:12-cv-03592-JFM (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/03/20/garcia_SOI_3-14-13.pdf; Statement of Interest of the 
United States at 1, Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, No. 1:11-cv-02888-BEL (D. Md. Jan. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/Sharp_SOI_1-10-12. 
pdf (“[P]rivate citizens have a First Amendment right to record police officers” and “officers 
violate citizens’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they seize and destroy 
recordings without a warrant or due process.”). 
 254. Charles v. City of New York (Challenging Unlawful Arrest of NYC Resident for 
Fliming Stop-and-Frisk Encounter), N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/case/ 
charles-v-city-of-new-york-challenging-unlawful-arrest-of-nyc-resident-filming-stop-and-frisk-e 
(last visited June 16, 2015).  
 255. Richard Gonzales, California Bill Could Limit Police Access to Body Camera 
Footage, NPR (May 1, 2015 3:38 AM), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/01/403316673/oakland-
laws-could-limit-police-access-to-body-camera-footage.  
 256. David Zurawik, Video Technology Changes the Evidence, Maybe Society, BALT. SUN 
(Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/entertainment/tv/z-on-tv-blog/bs-ae-zontv-freddie-
gray-video-20150424-story.html#page=1.  
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additional lens. With instant uploading and smartphones in the hands 
of citizens, these citizen journalists will provide some—but not all—
of the transparency necessary to a project of accountability.
257
  
D. Incentivizing Proactive Police Department Self-Examination and 
Reform 
In today’s smartphone environment, the familiar “BUT I 
THOUGHT HE HAD A GUN” may be evaluated with additional 
visual evidence.
258
 In an article in which Professor Cynthia Lee 
reviewed the myriad of police officer explanations for the killings of 
unarmed Black man, she noted that “[w]ith more and more 
consumers purchasing camcorders, the video recording of police 
misconduct may become more common.”259  
Now that digital video technology is embedded in many mobile 
devices, recording of police encounters has become central to 
renewed concerns about police abuse of power. In the ten years since 
Lee wrote, there has been an explosion of multiuse devices, 
miniaturization, and wireless connectivity technology. Today, 
millions of people have high-resolution cameras with autofocus and 
zoom. More importantly, social media sites make it possible for 
courageous bystanders to shape the narrative of police encounters 
long before police officers are able to write their official reports.
260
 
Public officials no longer need rely solely on post hoc explanations of 
police officers. Just as the Rodney King beating video elevated the 
visibility of essentially the group punishment of an unarmed suspect, 
the availability of video transforms the plausible self-defense 
rationales for the discharge of multiple rounds into unarmed people 
from “response to a threat” to narratives of summary execution for 
 
 257. Seth C. Lewis, Citizen Journalism: Motivation, Methods, Momentum, in THE FUTURE 
OF THE NEWS 59 (Maxwell McComb et al. eds., 2010).  
 258. Cynthia Lee, “But I Thought He Had A Gun”: Race and Police Use of Deadly Force, 
2 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1 (2004). 
 259. Id. at 16. 
 260. Ethan A. Huff, Police Gun Down Man in Street, Threaten to Shoot Witnesses for 
Filming Incident, NATURAL NEWS (June 9, 2011), http://www.naturalnews.com/032655_ 
police_brutality_citizen_journalism.html. 
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failure to comply with police orders. Whatever the state of mind of 
the officer who shot eight bullets at Walter Scott from behind, the 
narrative of threat was no longer viable, and in fact, it was the failure 
to comply with the officer’s orders that resulted in the ultimate 
sanction of death.
261
 
E. Rethinking the Scope of Immunity 
Videos of police homicides are shocking in their own right. But 
when they are at sharp odds with official reports, they raise questions 
about the presumptions and immunities that are embedded in existing 
law and about the problem of perjury.
262
 It is standard and sincere to 
observe that only few police encounters end with the death of a 
citizen, and that those who sacrifice normal lives and court danger to 
engage in police work deserve our thanks. Nonetheless, there is 
overwhelming anecdotal and statistical evidence that the deployment 
of excessive and deadly force occurs disproportionately in Black, 
minority, and poor communities. As argued above, the current legal 
framework governing the use of deadly force affords little 
accountability for the abuse of that power. Until recently, beginning 
with the viralization of the Rodney King beating to the heart breaking 
murders of Walter Scott
263
 and Tamir Rice,
264
 but for the citizen 
video, the police version—the dominant narrative of Black men 
threatening armed police officers—would have prevailed. The 
transparency possible with current technology in the hands of citizens 
is responsible for the credible counter-narrative of force in response 
to reasonable threat leading to the possibility of criminally culpable 
homicide.
265
  
 
 261. Christina Elmore & David MacDougall, Man Shot and Killed by North Charleston 
Police Officer After Traffic Stop; SLED Investigating, POST AND COURIER (Apr. 4, 2015, 11:54 
PM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20150404/PC16/150409635.  
 262. See Maclin, supra note 28, at 378–86. “Many scholars and observers of the criminal 
justice system [who] have acknowledged the . . . police perjury connected with Fourth 
Amendment cases.” Id. at 382 n.212.  
 263. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
 265. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.  
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F. A Continued Role for the Department of Justice? 
The DOJ has two tools available to combat excessive deadly 
force. One is its power to bring criminal prosecutions pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 242.
266
 This statute has resulted in few investigations and 
criminal charges in less than one percent of cases.
267
 The other tool is 
42 U.S.C. § 14141,
268
 which Congress enacted in the aftermath of the 
videotaped police beating of Rodney King in March 1991.
269
 42 
U.S.C. § 14141 raised hopes that the DOJ might be able to use its 
power to deter or redress police excessive force.
270
 
Rushin’s statistics show fifty-five investigations opened between 
1995 and 2012,
271
 with twenty-four negotiated settlement agreements 
dated between April 1997 and January 2013.
272
 Since Rushin’s 
article, the DOJ has investigated additional police departments, 
including three that figured prominently in recent police shootings 
and deaths: (1) Ferguson, Missouri, in the aftermath of the killing of 
Michael Brown;
273
 (2) Cleveland, Ohio, in the aftermath of Cleveland 
police Officer Timothy Loehman’s killing of twelve-year-old Tamir 
Rice;
274
 and (3) Baltimore, Maryland, in the aftermath of the death of 
Freddie Gray while in police custody.
275
 The Justice Department has 
also reached settlement agreements with Albuquerque, New 
 
 266. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).  
 267. Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Law Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 
3203 (2014). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (1994).. 
 269. Rodney King Beating Video, THE HOUR http://www.thehour.com/rodney-king-
beating-video/youtube_38f3798c-b891-11e1-92ec-0019bb30f31a.html (last visited July 9, 
2015); see also Black Musics, Rodney King Beating, DAILYMOTION (July 12, 2008), 
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x63u0w_rodney-king-beating_news.  
 270. 42 U.S.C. § 14141. 
 271. Rushin, supra note 267, at 3244–46. 
 272. Id. at 3437. 
 273. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 40.  
 274. See INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION OF POLICE, supra note 38. 
 275. Attorney General Loretta Lynch on Baltimore Police Investigation, CBS NEWS (May 
8, 2015, 11:12 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/attorney-general-loretta-lynch-on-baltimore 
-police-investigation/; Matt Apuzzo & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justice Department Will 
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Mexico;
276
 Portland, Oregon;
277
 Puerto Rico;
278
 Seattle, 
Washington;
279
 The District of Columbia;
280
 Cleveland, Ohio;
281
 and 
Antelope Valley, California.
282
  
The Justice Department has played a significant role in the events 
of 2013 through 2015, in both adversarial and cooperative roles, 
creating the possibility of a way out of imminent community 
breakdown and the possibility of investigations where public police 
killings threaten to undermine public trust in and beyond vulnerable 
Black communities.
283
 In other situations, the DOJ has provided 
federal resources and the opportunity for local officials to seek 
assistance when they are unable to protect citizens from excessive 
force due to both institutional police and community dynamics—such 
as excessive citizen on citizen violence beyond their control.
284
  
 
 276. Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-1025 
(D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www.apd_settlement_11-14-14.pdf.  
 277. Order Entering Settlement Agreement, Conditionally Dismissing Litigation, and 
Setting First Annual Settlement-Compliance Hearing, United States v. City of Portland, No. 3-
12-cv-226J (D. Or. Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/ 
documents/ppb_orderenteringsettle_8-29-14.pdf.  
 278. Agreement for the Sustainable Reform of the Puerto Rico Police Department, United 
States v. Puerto Rico, No. 12-cv-2039 (D.P.R. Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/12/21/prpd_agreement_12-21-12.pdf. 
 279. Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, United States v. 
City of Seattle, No. 12-cv-1282-JLR (D. Wash. July 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd_consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf; Memorandum 
Regarding Instructional System Design Model for Search and Seizure and Bias-Free Policing 
Training, United States v. City of Seattle, No. C12-1282-JLR (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2014), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/spd_docket176.pdf. United States 
v. City of Seattle Civil Action no. 12-cv-1282, July 27, 2012. 
 280. United States v. Retta, “Order Approving Consent Judgment, United States v. Retta, 
No. 1:11-cv-1280-JEB (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/ 
spl/documents/retta_order_1-14-13.pdf.”  
 281. Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-CV-1046 (N.D. 
Ohio May 26, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/cleveland_ 
agreement_5-26-15.pdf.  
 282. Settlement Agreement, United States v. Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_agreement_4-28-15.pdf. 
 283. See, e.g., Mollie Reilly, Justice Department to Investigate Eric Garner’s Death, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 3, 2014, 11:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/03/ 
justice-department-eric-garner_n_6264928.html (reporting DOJ investigation of Eric Garner’s 
death after Staten Island grand jury declined to indict officer at the request of the U.S. Senators 
from New York).. 
 284. See, e.g., Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Releases Report on Philadelphia 
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The DOJ has been a stabilizing force during a volatile period in 
which shocking acts of police violence against unarmed Blacks have 
exposed community vulnerability to arbitrary police violence. There 
are signs that local law enforcement officials and political leaders are 
stepping forward when a shooting occurs to promise investigation, to 
condemn the misuse of deadly force, and to vow to become directly 
involved in the community, arguing for a peaceful way forward.
285
 
Moreover, there is evidence that several current and future 
agreements may focus on changes in the very nature of policing, from 
military and broken-windows strategy toward collaborative processes 
that strengthen relationships between Black communities and their 
police department, establishing common norms and accountability. 
G. Restorative and Transitional Justice Approaches 
1. Paradigm Shift—The Cincinnati Collaborative Process 
Cincinnati, like many American cities, had serious racial policing 
issues that led to multiple reports and recommendations, which did 
not transform the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD), nor stem the 
tide of police shootings of Black men.
286
 The ACLU and Cincinnati’s 
 
Police Department’s Use of Deadly Force (Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
department-justice-releases-report-philadelphia-police-departments-use-deadly- (“In 2013, in 
response to an increase in officer-involved shootings, Philadelphia Police Commissioner 
Charles Ramsey requested technical assistance from the COPS Office. Launched in November 
2013, the Collaborative Reform Initiative in Philadelphia focuses on the use of deadly force 
over a seven-year period.”); GEORGE FACHNER & STEVEN CARTER, COMMUNITY ORIENTED 
POLICING SERVICES, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN ASSESSMENT OF DEADLY FORCE IN THE 
PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), available at http://ric-zai-inc.com/ric.php?page= 
detail&id=COPS-W0753; Cheryl Corley, Baltimore Mayor Asks Justice Department to 
Investigate Police Department, NPR (May 6, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/05/ 
06/404739764/baltimore-mayor-asks-justice-department-to-investigate-police-department; Luke 
Broadwater, Baltimore Mayor Seeks Federal Investigation of Police Department, BALT. SUN 
(May 6, 2015, 8:49 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-ci-doj-
partnership-20150506-story.html. 
 285. See, e.g., Walter Scott Shooting: North Charleston Orders 250 Body Cameras for 
Officers, NBC NEWS (Apr. 8, 2015, 7:34 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/walter-scott-
shooting/north-charleston-police-chief-walter-scott-shooting-i-was-sickened-n337941.  
 286. SAUL A. GREEN & RICHARD B. JEROME, CITY OF CINCINNATI INDEPENDENT 
MONITOR’S FINAL REPORT (2008), available at http://www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/linkservid/ 
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Black United Front sued to redress an alleged thirty-year pattern of 
racially discriminatory policing.
287
 Little progress in negotiations 
occurred until—just a month later—police shot and killed Timothy 
Thomas, “a young unarmed African American man.”288 Thereafter, 
Cincinnati established a “collaboration” which eventually involved 
thousands of citizens and multiple community groups.
289
 Pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 14141, negotiation between the Justice Department and 
City of Cincinnati ensued. As a result of these parallel processes, two 
agreements emerged: a memorandum of understanding between the 
City and the CPD, and a collaborative agreement among the City and 
the Fraternal Order of Police, which focused on the implementation 
of shared goals by the end of the tragic year. These included: 
 Police officers and community members will become 
proactive partners in community problem solving; 
 Build relationships of respect, cooperation and trust within 
and between police and communities; 
 Improve education, oversight, monitoring, hiring practices 
and accountability of the CPD; 
 Ensure fair, equitable, and courteous treatment for all; and 
 Create methods to ensure the public understands police 
policies and procedures, as well as recognize exceptional 
police service in an effort to foster community support for 
CPD officers.
290
 
 
97D9709F-F1C1-4A75-804C07D9873DC70F/showMeta/0/ [hereinafter CINCINNATI FINAL 
REPORT]. 
 287. Id. at 4. 
 288. Id. See also Francis X. Clines, Officer Charged in Killing That Roiled Cincinnati, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/us/officer-charged-in-killing-
that-roiled-cincinnati.html. 
 289. CINCINNATI FINAL REPORT, supra note 286, at 5. 
 290. Id. 
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Although the record of success may be less rosy than the picture 
painted by The Monitor’s final report in 2008,291 The Monitor 
acknowledged as much: 
The Collaborative created high expectations and difficult 
challenges. To some, the Collaborative was seen as the 
solution to decades of discord, with the expectation that high 
profile, unjust and unnecessary uses of force would no longer 
occur. When questionable uses of force did occur, some started 
to second-guess the effectiveness and worth of the 
Collaborative. It was also extremely difficult to harness the 
energy and emotion of an entire community over an extended 
period of time to participate in the transition of the police and 
the community to the new form of public safety envisioned by 
the CA.
292
 
There seems to be consensus that the breakthrough development lay 
in the incorporation of Herman Goldstein’s conception of problem 
oriented policing in the collaborative agreement.
293
 “A significant 
element of problem-oriented policing is the surfacing for analysis of 
repeat or recurring problems so that police and others can devise new 
and more effective means of reducing them and the harms from 
them” (including databases and community consultation).”294 The 
lessons of Cincinnati have begun to emerge in other, more recent 
Justice Department consent decrees and settlements. The May 26, 
2015, DOJ Settlement with Cleveland adopted a community and 
problem-oriented policing model in order to increase community 
engagement and build trust.
295
 The Albuquerque Settlement included 
 
 291. See generally The Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement, ACLU OF OHIO (Feb. 5, 
2013), http://www.acluohio.org/issue-information/the-cincinnati-collaborative-agreement. 
 292. CINCINNATI FINAL REPORT, supra note 286, at 8. 
 293. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING (1977). 
 294. CINCINNATI FINAL REPORT, supra note 286, at 44.  
 295. Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-CV-1046 at 8-9 
(N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ 
cleveland_agreement_5-26-15.pdf.  
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problem-oriented approaches,
296
 and the April 28, 2015, agreement 
between the DOJ and Antelope Valley, California, agreed that 
“methods, strategies, and techniques to reduce misunderstandings, 
conflict, and complaints due to perceived bias or discrimination, 
including problem oriented policing strategies.”297 It is promising that 
police departments are reaching out to the Justice Department for 
assistance in the creation of new paradigms of policing. Perhaps 
cities like Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Cleveland, to name a few, 
have no choice. In the new environment in which young people 
courageously film the police killings of their friends and publicize 
them to the world, there is the possibility for both accountability and 
action.  
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND MICHAEL BROWN 
Recent police killings of unarmed men—eighteen-year-old 
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri;
298
 twelve-year-old Tamir Rice 
in Cleveland, Ohio;
299
 forty-three-year-old Eric Garner in Staten 
Island, New York; 
300
 fifty-year-old Walter Scott in North Charleston, 
South Carolina;
301
 nineteen-year-old Tony Robinson in Madison, 
Wisconsin;
302
 twenty-five-year-old Freddie Gray in police custody in 
Baltimore, Maryland;
303
 and seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald in 
 
 296. Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-1025 at 78-
86 (D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ 
apd_settlement_11-14-14.pdf. 
 297. Settlement Agreement, United States v. Los Angeles (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/antelope_agreement_4-28-15.pdf. 
 298. Michael Brown Shooting, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-
brown-shooting (last visited June 17, 2015). 
 299. Cory Shaffer, Extended Tamir Rice Shooting Video Shows Officers Restrained Sister, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Jan. 8, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2015/ 
01/extended_tamir_rice_shooting_v.html.  
 300. ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner Put in a Chokehold by NYPD Officer—Video, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/ 
i-cant-breathe-eric-garner-chokehold-death-video. 
 301. Walter Scott Shooting, supra note 13. 
 302. Alex Johnson, Tony Robinson Shooting: No Charges for Wisconsin Police Officer, 
NBC NEWS (May 12, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/tony-robinson-
shooting-no-charges-lawful-use-force-n357876. 
 303. Alexander, supra note 13.  
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Chicago
304—are part of a longstanding pattern.305 They have thrust 
the nation into one of its perennial rituals, the debate over whether 
race matters. There is no doubt that circumstances do arise in which 
force may be necessary to protect life, but the notion that the review 
of its use should be a deferential one of “reasonableness” flouts the 
irreversible results of the use of today’s weapons and rejects the 
understanding that “death is different.”306 When police shoot 
unarmed civilians with weapons that cause grievous bodily injuries, 
police officers convert the badge to the hunting license that Joe 
Friday deplored.
307
 Moreover, with the development of an 
increasingly militarized police culture, trained to deploy with military 
SWAT tactics in communities that experience symbolic violence 
through structural racism, the use of deadly force against unarmed 
Blacks is an integral part of phenomena (including systemic hyper-
criminalization and mass incarceration) that stigmatize entire 
communities and contribute to stereotypes about the inherent 
dangerousness of those communities. Judicially sanctioned summary 
execution is an integral part of a jurisprudence of violence that shapes 
limited oversight of official violence in the streets, in the prisons, and 
in the imposition of the ultimate sanction of death. Without 
nationwide systemic interventions, the current legal regime will 
permit infrequent but highly symbolic ritualistic and Peckinpah-
like
308
 killings in defense of the authority of the State to demand 
 
 304. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 305. Ryan Gabrielson, Ryann Grochoswski Jones & Eric Sagara, Deadly Force, in Black 
and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:07 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-
force-in-black-and-white. 
 306. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 
2:117 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004). 
 307. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gilson, Medical Examiner’s Verdict, State of Ohio, Cuyahoga 
County Case No. 2014-01991, Dec. 11, 2014, available at http://ftpcontent4.worldnow.com/ 
woio/pdf/riceautopsy.pdf. Governor Cuomo of New York signed an executive order to require 
that an independent prosecutor investigate police shootings. Erin Durkin &, Glenn Blain, Gov. 
Cuomo Signs Order Giving Attorney General Eric Schneiderman Authority to Probe Police-
Involved Deaths, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (July 9, 2015, 10:34 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/politics/cuomo-appoints-schneiderman-prosecute-cop-involved-deaths-article-1.2285970. 
 308. Sam Peckinpah Overview, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001603/, (last 
visited June 17, 2015). See also Strawdogs Overview, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0067800/ (last visited June 17, 2015). 
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obedience and submission.
309
 Though death row grows elastically—
now at 2,635 inmates, 41 percent who are Black, there are relatively 
few executions; there were fifty from January 1, 2014, to May 18, 
2015, all carried out in relative secrecy via drug protocols. The death 
penalty still plays its historical racial subordination role: 
Capital punishment also has been crucial in the processes of 
demonizing young, black males and using them in the 
pantheon of public enemies to replace the Soviet “evil empire.” 
The death penalty is directed disproportionately not only 
against racial minorities, but also against those who kill white 
victims. In some jurisdictions blacks receive the death penalty 
at a rate 38 percent higher than all others; since 1976, 35 
percent of those executed have been African Americans. State 
killing is thus but one part of the intense criminalization of 
African American populations that occurred during the 1990s. 
“Governing through crime,” law professor and criminologist 
Jonathan Simon contends, “is a way of reviving the traditional 
appeal of white supremacy that African-Americans be 
governed in a distinct and degrading set of institutions.”310 
But the only public killing of Blacks today takes place by police 
officers, while the death penalty is carried out in secret. In contrast, 
“citizen journalists” and public video surveillance made the use of 
firearm deadly force visible, renewing the discussion of whether 
“race matters,” filling the streets with a new generation of young civil 
rights activists, asking whether “Black Lives Matter.”   
 
 309. Foucault called this the spectacle of violence. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND 
PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).  
 310. AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS 18 (2001). 
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Across the nation, multiracial young activists are urging City 
Fathers
311
 and City Mothers
312
 to establish racial justice in policing in 
America, such that it will be clear that “Black Lives Matter.” That 
aspiration is arguably vague, but it is less important and fundamental 
than the aspiration of Due Process and Equal Protection. It is 
unfortunate that recent circumstances involving smartphone footage 
of brutal killings have been suffered in order to re-clarify its minimal 
content—an end to the brutalization and killings of unarmed Black 
men and women. This is not a new concern, but it is one that must be 
a baseline priority in the course of our quest for an inclusive 
constitutional democracy.  
 
 311. See e.g., Caroline Bach, Madison Mayor Paul Soglin Speaks at the Scene of the 
Shooting, WKOW.COM (Mar. 7, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.wkow.com/story/28287232/2015/ 
03/07/madison-mayor-paul-soglin-speaks-at-the-scene-of-the-shooting; Scott Bauer, Police 
Shooting Forces Discussion of Madison’s Racial Divide, FOX11ONLINE.COM (Mar. 10, 2015), 
http://fox11online.com/2015/03/10/police-shooting-forces-discussion-of-madisons-racial-divide/; 
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